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ABSTRACT
Every company pursues a different strategy, and banks are no different. In the
banking industry, each bank performs its business based on its own business strategies.
Japanese banks have different strategies, but in terms of Japanese banks as a whole, there is
little difference among them. From my prior work experience in Germany, I became aware of
obvious differences between Japanese banks and German banks in terms of thought
processes and doing business--despite being in the same industry.
I believe cultural issues have a significant effect on each bank's strategy. The diverse
strategies among banks have evolved from the various ways of thinking, sensing, and doing,
which are formed based on deep-seated cultural values or assumptions in each country.
In this thesis, in the first section, I discuss a specific system implementation project,
which provides a framework for identifying fundamental problems and developing a
theoretical approach toward the problems. Then I analyze the cultural effects on Japanese,
German and US banks, comparing the data analysis and personal interviews among three
banks.
My desire is to shed light on the differences among banks in three countries and to
reveal the reasons for such differences. It is hoped that this will give Japanese banks a
substantial push so that they will differentiate themselves before global competition becomes
even more severe.
Thesis Supervisor: John E. Van Maanen
Title: Erwin H. Schell Professor of Organization Studies
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Organizational Strategy
There are many opportunities for discussing organizational strategy. Most company
leaders spend a great deal of time thinking about how to make their organizations ideal,
efficient, and practical. For example, major Japanese banks have changed and modified their
organizations many times over the last decade due to corporate decisions to pursue the most
optimal organization structure.
When problems appear, people often argue that an "unorganized" organization caused
the problems, and suggestions abound for changing the organization to resolve the problems.
Every company's annual report tells how it restructured the organization in response to some
problem. Japanese banks are no exception.
However, in my experience while working at a major Japanese bank, I have wondered
whether such organization restructuring had an effect on solving problems. It is evident to me
that the organization structure itself cannot automatically solve problems. Problems are
solved by the people working in the organizations, not by the organization itself. Even if a
special organization is constructed to deal with a problem, it will not solve a problem without
utilizing people who have appropriate problem-solving qualifications. This seems like a
simple issue, but I believe senior leaders in Japanese banks-like high ranking managers
elsewhere-tend to focus on organization structure and tend not to discuss people as part of
their problem-solving strategy.
In my company, the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (BTM), one of Japan's largest banks, I
have witnessed numerous occasions when the people in an organization did not change even
though the organization itself had changed. Also other times when people with lesser ability
were not transferred to another division where their skills fit better, nor were they fired. I
wonder why such things happened when it is obvious that an unqualified employee should be
replaced by someone who can better perform the requisite tasks.
This reflects Japan's traditional philosophy of lifetime employment, a Japanese custom
since World War II. Although there are no physical contracts that guarantee lifetime
employment, it is still customary in most Japanese companies. BTM still maintains this
policy in favor of its employees as do other Japanese banks. This is not a corporate culture
issue but something more ingrained in every Japanese bank. I think one reason for continuing
this tradition can be called "collectivism," described as "a prime orientation toward common
goals and objectives" (Persons and Shils, 1951; they use the word "communitarianism"). In a
collective society, the group goal has utmost priority, and favoritism is not shown. Therefore,
no one is evaluated extremely high or low. Even the most poorly evaluated person will not be
fired.
1.2 Effects of Culture on Corporate Strategy
Most major Japanese banks conduct their business in the same manner. During the
so-called "bubble economy" of the early 1990s, every bank invested huge amounts of money
in real estate. When the bubble collapsed, every bank incurred enormous amounts of bad debt,
and it took more than ten years for the banks to write off most of the bad debts and return to
net profit. Those ten years between 1990 and 2000 are now called the "lost decade" in Japan.
When I worked in Japan, I did not think much of the strategies adopted by Japanese
banks. It was difficult to differentiate the ways in which Japanese banks do business because
they are strictly controlled by the financial authority of the Japanese government. However,
when I began working in Germany as a banking officer, and we encountered stiff competition
from German banks, I realized that German banks approach their clients very differently
from Japanese banks. And while German banks are also under the control of the national
banking authority, they do not face the same situation as Japanese banks. For example, one
German bank can offer a higher rate while other will offer a much lower rate; in Japan, all
banks set virtually the same rate-almost as if they had agreed beforehand.
Even today, the strategies of Japanese banks do not differ significantly. Most invest in
the same business areas at the same time; they earn similar profits; they suffer from similar
problems because they all pursue similar corporate strategies. Why? I believe it must be
because there is some cultural element that influences how Japanese banks develop their
strategies.
The word "culture" has many meanings. For instance, Hofstede (1991) defines it as
"the collective mental programming of people in an environment. Culture is not a
characteristic of individuals; it encompasses a number of people who were conditioned by
the same education and life experience."
It is important, therefore, to distinguish the level of culture. According to Schein (2004),
there are three levels of culture: artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, and underlying
assumptions. Artifacts reside at the surface, and include phenomena that one sees, hears, or
feels. They also include the visible output of the group. They are easy to observe, but difficult
to decipher. Espoused beliefs and values include strategies, goals, and philosophies. When a
new group is created, those who can influence the group to adopt a certain approach to a
problem will later be identified as leaders. What leaders want and what is shared among the
members become beliefs or values that ultimately transform into assumptions, the third layer.
However, not all beliefs and values undergo such a transformation. Only the beliefs and
values that can be empirically tested and continue to work reliably become assumptions.
Those basic assumptions are so taken for granted that one finds little variation within the
social unit. Schein explains: "Cultures as a set of basic assumptions define for us what to pay
attention to, what things mean, how to react emotionally to what is going on, and what
actions to take in various kinds of structures." (Organizational Culture and Leadership, p. 32)
Corporate culture is one level within Japan's overall culture, and it belongs within
Schein's espoused beliefs and values. Therefore, if one talks about corporate culture, many
differences can be seen among the Japanese banks. But all of them fear failure or bankruptcy,
and this could be why Japanese banks tend to adopt similar banking strategies that are driven
by the basic assumptions of Japanese culture.
1.3 Thesis Structure
My research focuses on banks in three countries: Japan, Germany, and the U.S. I will
use two types of analysis to identify national banking strategies in each country. The first is
data analysis based on published data; the second is practical, first-hand analysis via personal
interviews. I will compare the factual information from the published data with information
culled from the interviews to determine relationships between the two analyses. Then I will
highlight key elements that differentiate the national banks of the three countries.
In Chapter Two I will describe a new banking system project of a Japanese bank and
use that framework to articulate my initial questions about cultural issues. The banking
project itself involved huge costs in terms of time, money, and human resources, and it
created basic problems that should have been solved in previous phases.
I will explain the problems using a service operations framework and a gap model to
identify the causes. The gap model is a conceptual framework into which one can position
key concepts, strategies, and decisions in services marketing (Zeithaml & Bitner, 1996). It
measures the service quality gaps between the services companies provide and the customers'
perceptions. However, this research also raises questions about whether such causes are
linked to cultural fundamentals that cannot be easily changed.
Chapter Three provides data analysis. To determine the differences and commonalities
of each national bank's strategy, I chose four Japanese banks, four German banks, and three
U.S. banks. I used each bank's published data, such as annual reports, financial reports, and
IR presentation papers for FY 2004. By focusing on the business portfolio that shows each
bank's corporate banking business and geographical business segments, I will try to identify
correlations between business strategy and geographical network strategy, which could offer
clues to explain cultural backgrounds and differences.
In Chapters Four, Five, and Six, I will describe interview results. The interviews were
conducted between January and March 2006. I interviewed 15 people: 7 Japanese, 4 German,
and 4 American. The interviewees' names, titles, and bank affiliation are listed in Appendix 1.
The major research questions for the interviews included:
1. Organization of the bank's corporate banking division
1-1. What does your bank 's organization structure look like (any significant differences
from Japanese bank)?
1-2. What is the organizational responsibility structure?
1-3. Describe employee contract and human resources development system
1-4. What personal evaluation system is used?
1-5. How close or far is the relationship between the employer and the union?
1-6. What about relations between the front office and the systems and operation division?
2. Corporate banking strategy
2-1. What is the target customer segment?
2-2. Describe the functions of the "main bank system"
2-3. Describe the risk evaluation system
2-4. How do you think quantitative factors affect credit risk evaluation?
2-5. Describe the bank 's investment policy
Appendix 2 provides a sample of questions that I submitted to each interviewee
beforehand.
Based on the interview results and analysis, I will describe each bank's overall
philosophy and policies in terms of organizational structure and banking strategy.
Chapter Seven will explain core cultural values. I will describe how these core values
affect each national bank by using Hofstede's map and list of values. I also articulate how the
Samurai spirit, as a core Japanese value, influences Japanese thinking and behavior, and may
still have a major affect on the strategies of Japanese banks. For this, I will refer to the book
Bushido, written by Inazo Nitobe in 1889.
The goal of this thesis is to identify lessons and implications for Japanese banks by
analyzing the strategies utilized by Japanese banks and the banks of Germany and the U.S. It
would be easy to attribute everything to cultural differences. However, not much attention is
paid to the underlying causes of those differences; instead, they seem to be defined by
looking only on the surface. But culture is like an onion: it comes in layers, and to understand
it, it has to be peeled back layer by layer, until the deepest core is reached, i.e., the norms and
values that are difficult for outsiders to understand. I am convinced I will find meaningful
answers by going to this level. If Japanese banks hope to be truly global, there is much they
can learn from other banks and incorporate into their core values. In this thesis I will provide
ideas and recommendations for Japanese banks that wish to enhance their future growth and
expand in the international market.
CHAPTER 2
Cultural Issues Affecting New System Implementation
As discussed in Chapter 1, my hypothesis is that there are critical cultural influences on
an organization's activities. In this chapter I will identify several cultural issues by citing my
own experience with a new system implementation project at Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi.
I have chosen this example because, for me it raised simple but fundamental questions.
Before I became involved in this thesis project, I worked primarily in the customer relations
office and had nothing to do with banking systems. Hence, like an outsider, many issues that
made sense to IT people were not understandable to me. Also, I confronted various problems
during the course of this project, but I found that most people tended to see them as surface
issues. I believe the reasons behind some of the problems are more inherent, and in this sense
this thesis has made me think in greater detail about the cultural aspects.
2.1 A New System Implementation Project
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (BTM) is one of Japan's largest banks, providing retail
and corporate banking services to clients in Japan and other major cities around the world. In
carrying out its activities, BTM uses specialized computer applications and systems,
developed in-house, to manage and supervise its operations, both within and outside Japan
Until early 2004, the system used for managing operations outside Japan was one that
had been in place for about 18 years, and it had become obsolete and inadequate to satisfy
diverse customer needs and BTM's own internal operating needs. A new system known as
"OVS" was developed and deployed in 2004 to help resolve issues emanating from the use of
the previous system.
2.2 Implementation of OVS
The mandate of the OVS project was to deliver a new banking system that would
update the operations of BTM's European branches. Figures 2-1 and 2-2 are schematic
diagrams of BTM's computer systems before and after the OVS project.
Figure 2-1
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The essential difference between the new and old systems is centralization. With the old
system, each branch maintained its own system with local staff, and they were perceived to
provide good service. However, the old system did not unify branch information with the
head office systems.
The new system has a central server in Tokyo to which each European branch is
connected. Each branch uses the same type of terminal. Each branch and head office can see
and manipulate all customer data. The new system is maintained by staff in Tokyo.
2.3 Organization Structure
Figure 2-3 shows the different stakeholders in the OVS project. The European branches
are controlled by the Global Corporate Planning division (GCP) in Tokyo, and each
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The System Division (SD) in Tokyo is an independent division of BTM that controls
technical computing matters, both in Tokyo and in each European branch. SD created the
OVS computer system and is responsible for the technical aspects of the OVS rollout.
The New System Implementation Task Force (NSI) is a temporary organization
established by GCP to roll out OVS to the European branches. NSI is also based in Tokyo.
Finally, each branch has an NSI Project Management Office (PMO) that rolls out OVS at the
local level.
2.4 Results of the OVS Implementation
OVS had an difficult rollout. The German branch counted over 100 problems, a figure
to which other bank branches could attest. Several problems were unsolvable and others took
a long time to rectify. The result was a significant loss of current and potential business for
BTM.
Most of these problems were the result of poor understanding of branch needs.
Examples include: incomplete customer account statements, excessive/wasteful use of paper,
customer statements written only in English, reduced compatibility with customers' existing
computer banking systems, increased (and unjustified) complexity to branch internal
procedures, incomplete user manuals/documentation, and significantly decreased flexibility
to meet customer needs.
Many of the problems that the branches experienced were symptoms of larger problems
with the project team's service delivery process. Two frameworks that highlight these larger
problems are applied below.
2.4.1 Framework for Analyzing Service Operations
The OVS delivery project has three environments: internal, external, and interface (see
Figure 2-4). Underlying problems are explored in terms of these relationships.
Figure 2-4
Chart of OVS implemantation project
Source: Bitran and Lojo, 1993 (A Framework for Analyzing Service Quality)
It is useful to classify the questions that I address according to the environments to
which they pertain. This framework illustrates this basic concept and presents a way of
thinking about the relationship between the major functions and participants in service
operations.
External Environment and Poor Identification of Customer Needs
In 2000 an investigation team was sent to identify the requirements of BTM's European
branches. This team based its investigation on BTM's London office, with limited
investigation of any other European offices. The investigation team returned to Japan with
little understanding of the specific cultural issues that regularly challenge a multilingual
European office (e.g., the need to print account statements in several languages, or
minimizing paper waste to comply with environmental concerns). These misunderstandings
were further compounded when NSI rolled out the project in 2004 based on an incomplete
and outdated investigation.
These and other problems could have been avoided if the project investigation had
recognized (a) the importance of a precise product definition, i.e., delivery of an OVS system
that met the core needs of all European branches, and (b) the rollout's fast clockspeed, which
required flexible service delivery in order to adapt to evolving customer needs four years
later.
Further, acting in this external environment, NSI did not introduce their new service
effectively. The NSI Project Management Office (PMO) failed to communicate its role and it
most users soon found that the product was difficult to adopt with little perceived
value-added to branch operations.
Ineffective Interface Coordination
An important part of any roll-out process is managing bug fixes and requests for
software changes. As the entity responsible for interfacing with customers, the PMO's task
was to coordinate SD's limited resources in Japan with the branches' need for service. Refer
back to Figure 2-3 for an illustration of NSI's system for delivering SD's services to the
customer.
This system had many levels and distributed responsibilities, with at least four layers
(branch - PMO clerk - PMO head - systems division) between the customer and the service
provider. This stifled information flow, decreased the power of service providers to "own" a
customer's problem, and increased service delays to unacceptable levels (for example, a
change that previously would take local staff only two weeks took Tokyo staff six months to
complete).
Limited Flexibility
Interface coordination was exacerbated by the fact that members of the SD team were
often so specialized they could only solve a specific type of problem, and were not trained to
focus on solving a customer's specific needs.
From the NSI's functions shown in Figure 2-4, it can be assumed that NSI's failure to
design a system that maximized the capabilities of people to deliver service created costly
and unnecessary misunderstandings that sacrificed BTM's profits.
2.4.2 Gap Framework to Suggest Further Improvements
While the service operations framework is useful for describing the structural causes of
service delivery problems, the gap framework can highlight differences between the
customer expectations and what is actually received. Figure 2-5 shows the gap framework
applied to services delivered to BTM's European bank branches as of 2005.
Figure 2.-5 ( ap. M odel) ------------------- -----------
Corvorate Customer
Bank
Source: Zeithanml and Bitner, 1996. (Services Marketing, McGraw-Hill)
Gap 5 is the largest - the gap between what customers expect and what they perceive to
be getting. However, Gap 5 is actually comprised of several other gaps.
Gap 1 is a major gap because NSI failed to adequately inform senior management of
the customers' needs, and it was not aware of the clockspeed of European banking (i.e.,
information collected in 2000 is outdated by 2004).
Gaps 2 and 3 are comparatively less significant because NSI has competently translated
its view of customer needs into a service chain. However, NSI's culture does not emphasize
employee empowerment, and as a result service staff do not have the flexibility to meet
customer needs at the front line.
Gap 4 is significant because the PMO overpromised on service improvements that have
yet to emerge, and there was inadequate communication to the branches by management of
the project's intentions. More communication with the branches at an earlier stage could have
avoided many of the later implementation problems.
2.5 Analysis and Recommendation
An analysis of the application of the service operations and gap frameworks suggests
several key improvements that could be made for both structure of service delivery and what
that service must do to satisfy the needs of branches and customers. These include:
* improve culturally specific services to solve European bank needs outside of London;
* improve flexibility of service to reflect the high clockspeed of modem banking
services;
* reduce the complexity of the interface between branches and SD service providers;
* increase empowerment of NSI and SD service staff to take ownership of whole
customer complaints;
* enhance the skillsets of SD service staff so that they can solve a wider range of
problems;
* increase communication between management and customers so both sides
understand the nature and scope of the project.
Overall, this analysis found that greater understanding between management and the
European bank branches would significantly improve the level of service in rolling out
technical services to the branches. The end results are reduced costs, improved service to
customers, and increased levels of customer satisfaction.
2.6 Cultural Effects
There are several important ways to solve the problems. The question is: if we accept
the solutions and implement them, could BTM realize significant improvements to its
services and greater efficiency of internal operation? Perhaps, but I also believe there may be
a more deep-seated problem tied to the Japanese culture itself.
2.6.1 Project Strategy
The project schedule was precisely constructed and there was sufficient leeway to
reschedule the plan and change the project direction. There was also enough budget to
modify the system design in the intermediate period and to take care of potential problems
after the implementation. However, that did not work. Once the project was set, people
focused on implementing the system on schedule. The means had transformed to the purpose.
Besides, there was no more budget to further modify the system design in order to meet
customer needs.
I think two cultural issues affected the strategy. The first is the culture of "power
distance." Japanese companies have a rigid hierarchy, and the power distance between
higher- ranked people and subordinates is very large. Once the higher-ranked officer makes a
decision and gives instructions to subordinates, they are expected to get the job done. No
excuses are allowed. The new system project was a critical project, and the CEO monitored
its progress. In this situation, maintaining the schedule and achieving implementation became
the highest priority rather than meeting customer needs.
The second cultural issue is the "tendency to avoid risk." I believe the Japanese do not
like to take risk; they are generally very risk-averse. Given this tendency, the Japanese
banking industry is strongly controlled by the financial authority. No mistakes are allowed.
Even though the new system was designed for other countries, the initial investigation and
analysis was insufficient because people in the Japanese head office did not recognize the
feature differences of existing systems in European countries.
Two examples are useful. One is language. Apart from the emotional issue, some
documents written in English are not acceptable as official bank statements for tax, legal, and
financial authorities in European countries. But the Japanese head office investigated only a
small number of sample documents and made the decision to standardize English bank
statements. Another example is concern about environmental issues. Germany is well known
for its efforts to introduce political measures dealing with the environment, and Germans in
general are quite sensitive to and conscious of environment-friendly decisions. They work to
minimize waste and trash on a daily basis. The importance of environmental issues was
under- valued by the Tokyo head office, and consequently the bank generated huge amounts
of paper-much to the dismay of their German counterparts.
These gaps led to additional investigations and design changes just before
implementation in an effort to make everything perfect by spending more money than had
been initially been budgeted or planned.
2.6.2 Organization
There were three key organizational players in this project: Systems Division (SD),
New System Implementation Task Force (NSI), and the branches themselves. The most
important organization was NSI because it was responsible for identifying the needs and
opinions of SD and the branches so as to produce the most optimal effects from the new
system. In other word, only NSI could have done it. SD could not because it is the system
specialist and it did not know about customer needs. The branches could not because they
focus on customer needs in order to create more business; they have no idea about the details
of the system.
Here, too, the culture of "power distance" played a critical role. While both SD and the
branches had their respective, rigid hierarchical organizations, NSI was a temporary
organization put together only for this project. NSI did not have any power. It could not make
decisions regarding the project, either against or in favor of SD and the branches. As the
focus of this project changed to maintaining the schedule, the voice of SD gradually grew
until NSI became a part of transformed SD.
2.6.3 Human resources
Human resources within SD and NSI were an issue. Employee qualifications in both
organizations were low-a result, I believe, of our culture of "collectivism." Most Japanese
prefer teamwork and tend to evaluate the individual based on how much he/she contributed
to the team. The notion of a team-oriented culture generates egalitarianism, which extends to
the traditional policy of lifetime employment. In general, Japanese companies do not lay off
employees but instead make strong efforts to keep their employees contributing to the
company. In my experience, this policy is in force at BTM and there are a number of people
with low ability who are not qualified for an organization with high responsibility and high
risk. I believe those people should be put in some other position in the bank. Instead, these
less-qualified people were put into NSI. This is related to the lifetime employment system
still implemented in BTM and other Japanese banks. I will discuss this issue in greater detail
in Chapter 4.
My hypothesis is that the deep-seated cultural issues underlying the phenomena I have
described could be applicable for most of the events I have ever faced-often with
uncomfortable feelings. The explanation I have given in this section is a micro example, but
insofar as the bank is an aggregation of many organizations, and they are composed of
Japanese people, these cultural issues could indeed influence the bank's macro strategy.
CHAPTER 3
Data Analysis
In this chapter I will discuss the profit and business portfolios of major banks in three
countries based on published financial and IR data. I selected the top three or four major
banks in each country. The group of Japanese banks, called "city banks," has diverse business
lineups and deploys an international business network. These banks compete with major
European and U.S. banks in the same bank category, so the comparison is intended to be
relatively equal.
3.1 Definition of "Corporate Banking"
The banking business is generally referred to as "corporate banking," but what that
term means differs from bank to bank. Some banks define "corporate banking" as similar to
traditional banking, including loans, deposits and various clearing transactions. It may also
be called "commercial banking." Other banks utilize a broader meaning to include
investment banking, such as issuing equities and bonds, M&As, and financial advice.
Japanese banks tend to distinguish these services as distinct from corporate banking.
During my research through the published information, I found that each bank in each
country defined "corporate banking." Therefore, I define this term in the narrow sense, that is,
excluding investment banking. I also note when a bank's business portfolio seems to be a
combination of both corporate and investment banking.
3.2 The Japanese Banking Industry
The Japanese banking industry can be roughly divided into two categories: city banks
and regional banks.
City Banks
Until the early 1990s, there were 13 city banks, 6 of which were part of conglomerates
(Zaibatsu). There were three long-term credit banks, authorized by law to support the heavy
industries that anchored the Japanese economy after World War II. The collapse of the bubble
economy forced these banks to confront many bad debts, which resulted in severe financial
distress. In 1996, Mitsubishi Bank merged with Bank of Tokyo, the smallest city bank, which
meant that the Mitsubishi conglomerate absorbed a minor city bank.
After 2000, the financial problems of city banks became more critical, which triggered
a series of bank mergers among city banks, especially outside the conglomerates, and against
conventional wisdom in the banking industry.
Today there are five city banks that offer full banking services all over Japan and also
conduct international business.
Regional Banks
There are 112 regional banks. Their head offices are located in each prefecture and
their main business is banking for local companies and private customers in their own area.
They are doing almost no international business. Therefore, I will not focus on regional
banks in this thesis.
3.2.1 Data Summary for Four Major Japanese Banks
Table 3-1 summarizes the latest financial data for Japan's four major banks.
Table 3-1 US $ in million
MTFG UFJ SMBC Mizuho
Net Revenue 15,938 11,297 17,608 17,330
Interest income 55.0% 56.8% 57.8% 55.5%
Trustee fees 5.5% 4.6% 0.1% 3.2%
Non-interest fees 27.3% 19.2% 25.5% 23.7%
Trading fees 6.8% 1.6% 7.1% 8.3%
Others 5.4% 17.8% 9.4% 9.3%
Net Income 2,943 -5,930 -2,037 5,455
Total assets 959,004 717,857 867,233 1,244.141
Portion of Corporate Banking 50.1% 43.9% 73.6% 43.9%
Source: Annual Reports for FY2004 of MTFQ UFJ, SMBC and Mizuho
The data illustrates the characteristics of Japanese banks. First, the structure of net
revenue does not differ among the four banks. Each bank earned its main revenue from
interest income, which represents around 55% of total net revenue. The non-interest fee
portion is similar, although the proportion of UFJ is a somewhat lower. This trend is
consistent with the total average ratio of all Japanese banks (129), that is, the average of
interest income is 64.9% and non-interest fee income is 16.5%.
Second, it is clear that corporate banking is core for all four banks. Due to limited
information about segment breakdown, SMBC appears to bring in more corporate banking
business, but in fact there is little difference compared to the other three banks.
Thus, when considering the data, it is hard to see how each bank differentiates its
strategy from its other competitors.
3.2.2 Analysis of Four Major Japanese Banks
MTFG Group
Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group (MTFG) is a member of the Mitsubishi
conglomerate, which consists of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. (BTM) and Mitsubishi Trust
and Banking Corporation. BTM was established in 1996 after Mitsubishi Bank (the
third-largest city bank at the time) and Bank of Tokyo (a foreign exchange bank) merged. In
2001, MTFG was established by including Mitsubishi Trust in order to pursue synergy
effects for customer services and internal rationalization.
US$ in million
Fiscal Year 2002 2003 2004
Net revenue 15,281 15,335 15,938
Interest income 9,207 8,949 8,772
Trustee fees 882 751 877
Non-interest fees 3,084 3,666 4,343
Trading fees 695 1,179 1,090
Others 1,325 787 854
Operating profit 6,645 6,897 7,310
Current net profit -1,403 4,877 2,943
Loans 408263 405,131 403,866
Deposits 544,559 574,761 587,380
Total assets 862,394 927,090 959,004
Number of employees 43,948
Network 736
domestic 328
foreign 408
Source: Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, Inc. (2005) Annual Report 2005
In terms of total assets, MTFG is ranked second among all Japanese banks; in terms of
net revenue it is ranked third. Unlike other banks, MTFG's financial condition is sound, and
it did not accept any capital injection from the Japanese government after the collapse of the
bubble economy. Because its international network is larger than its competitors, MTFG is
MTFG Business Portfolio (Based on Operating
Profit)
regarded as the most international bank in Japan. Its UNBC business unit is a merger with
Union Bank of California, so the bank runs a full banking business in California as a U.S
regional bank.
In 2004 corporate finance comprised 50% of the bank's portfolio. MTFG's strategy is
focused on corporate and retail business, and it aims to evolve those business areas even
further.
Recently MTFG began to pursue an integrated group strategy. In July 2004, MTFG
decided to integrate with UFJ Group to further promote this strategy, seeking to become one
of the top five global financial institutions (based on market value) by FY 2008. In order to
achieve maximum leverage of its strengths, MTFG will further strengthen the integrated
business group and develop its subsidiaries so they respond fully and quickly to customers'
needs. The bank aims to create a premier, comprehensive, global financial group that can
succeed against global competitors and win strong customer support.
According to its annual report, MTFG identifies three core businesses: (1) corporate
finance, (2) retail business, and (3) trust business. Its aim is to enlarge the proportion of these
three core businesses to 90% from the current 72%. Its ultimate goal is to achieve a well-
balanced, highly profitable business portfolio.
UFJ Group
UFJ Group was formed in April 2001 from the merger of Sanwa Bank, Tokai Bank,
and Toyo Trust Banking Corporation. Sanwa Bank was the financial arm of the Sanwa
conglomerate, one of six Japanese conglomerates that include many independent companies
(including former Nissan Motors). UFJ's main business territory was western Japan centered
by Osaka. Tokai Bank was famous for being the financial bank for Toyota Group located in
Nagoya area.
The reason for forming UFJ Group and including a trustee business (Toyo Trust) was
to focus on the small and middle company market and to create synergies that would enable
it to expand geographically and to target additional customers.
US$ in million
Fiscal Year 2002 2003 2004
Net revenue 11,926 11,846 11,297
Interest income 6,882 6,784 6,420
Trustee fees 673 579 523
Non-interest fees 1,454 1,917 2,169
Trading fees 851 1,275 176
Others 2,064 1,290 2,006
Operating profit 6,773 6,910 6,674
Current net profit -5,440 -3,265 -5,930
Loans 384,162 369,240 32821
Deposits 444,779 460,658 44 1 ,093
Total assets 697,456 714,212 717,857
Number of employees 31,453
Network 566
domestic 540
foreign 26
Source: UFJ Holding, Inc. (2005) Annual Report 2005
UFJ has suffered from considerable bad debts, and the bank was forced to accept a
capital injection from the Japanese government to resolve its financial problems. As the
financial data above shows, UFJ spent its entire profit to write off the bad debts, and as a
result the current net income for 2004 remains deeply negative.
In June 2004, UFJ Group received an administrative censure from the Financial
Services Agency for an improper response to inspections. Former staffs, including executive
officers, were convicted of violating provisions of the Japanese banking law. Therefore, it is
understandable that at the beginning of UFJ's 2005 Annual Report it states that UFJ Group is
working to rebuild solid corporate governance and a system of internal controls.
UFJ Business Portfolio (Based on Operating
Profit)
_
In terms of its business portfolio, corporate finance is the major share (44%). Although
this share is lower than that of MTFG, it is assumed that "Treasury & International" business
includes some portion of the corporate finance business conducted outside of Japan.
Therefore, the proportion of corporate finance is undoubtedly larger than the figure shown on
the chart.
The 2005 Annual Report notes that one of UFJ's goals is to increase its housing loans
and loans to small and medium-size enterprises. Another goal is to enhance retail services
through more fees and commissions from ATMs, asset management services, and other
sources, and to enhance corporate services through expanding settlements, derivatives, trusts,
and other business categories. UFJ's greatest strength is its willingness to take on new
challenges and then carry through with concrete actions. UFJ has already created many new
groundbreaking services for its customers.
UFJ merged with MTFG in January 2006. The new group is named Mitsubishi Tokyo
UFJ Group. This merger is widely viewed as MTFG giving a helping hand to UFJ, otherwise
it could not survive its severe financial distress and lost reputation as a result of the legal
punishment.
SMBC Group
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (SMBC) was founded as a result of the merger of
Sakura Bank and Sumitomo Bank in 2001. This merger caused a sensation because the two
largest zaibatsu agreed with the merger even though it transcended the boundaries of
conventional conglomerates.
Culturally, these two parties to the merger are very different While Sakura (Mitsui)
espouses a mild and gentlemanly corporate culture derived from the eastern region of Japan,
Sumitomo maintains an aggressive and tough negotiating corporate culture derived from the
Osaka region in western Japan. Since medieval times, Osaka has been the center of
commercial trading, so it was expected that after the merger Sumitomo would take the
initiative in deciding the business direction of the new banking entity.
US$ in million
Fiscal Year 2002 2003 2004
Net revenue 18,991 17,996 17,608
Interest income 12,170 11,139 10,185
Trustee fees 0 3 23
Non-interest fees 3,069 3,688 4,488
Trading fees 1,789 2,643 1,255
Others 1,963 520 1,657
Operating profit 9,835 9,483 8,821
Current net profit -4,046 2,873 -2,037
Loans 531,156 481,590 476,520
Deposits 547,226 568,117 595,433
Total assets 909,630 888,827 867,233
Number of employees 21,020
Network 489
domestic 472
foreign 17
Source: Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, Inc. (2005) Annual Report 2005
Indeed, the aggressive stance is seen in the bank's 2004 mission statement, which
states:
SMBC's competitive edge derives from its four strengths of (a) solid business
franchise in commercial banking, (b) spirit of innovation and transformation, (c)
speed in making business profitable and (d) high efficiency. In order to leverage
those strengths, grasp the ever-changing needs of its customers and future grow its
business, it reflected on what kind of organization it should be and the direction it
should take. The obvious answer is to become a globally competitive top bank with
the highest trust of its customers, its shareholders, the market and the society. It will
formulate and implement its business strategies guided by this mission.
Today, SMBC maintains a culture that is willing to take more risk and to drive into
SMBC Business Portfolio (Based on Operating
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new areas - features that distinguish it from other major banks.
Regarding the bank's business line, its corporate banking business comprises 73% of
total business. Because SMBC does not have a trust banking unit, the bank focuses on
corporate finance as its core business. Yet, analyzing the breakdown of net revenue, each
profit segment, especially net interest income (57%) and non-interest fees (26%), is similar to
the other banks. There is no significant difference regarding the source of profit.
Mizuho Financial Group
Mizuho Financial Group was founded in April 2002 as a result of the triple merger
between Fuji Bank, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, and Industrial Bank of Japan. Fuji Bank
belonged to Fuyo Group, and Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank was the financial institution for
Ichi-Kan Group. Like the SMBC merger before it, the Mizuho merger also went beyond the
boundaries of existing zaibatsu. In terms of total assets, Mizuho is the largest bank in Japan
and its net revenues are almost the same as SMBC.
Today Mizuho Financial Group is comprised of three independent banks: Mizuho
Bank, Mizuho Corporate Bank, and Mizuho Trust and Banking Company. Mizuho Bank
focuses on retail business and corporate banking for small and medium-size companies while
Mizuho Corporate Bank covers corporate banking targeting large and international firms.
US$ in million
Fiscal Year 2002 2003 2004
Net revenue 19,423 18,368 17,330
Interest income 10,924 10,304 9,621
Trustee fees 482 539 550
Non-interest fees 3,570 3,710 4,110
Trading fees 2,126 2,016 1,435
Others 2,319 1,798 1,615
Operating profit 0 8,799 7,935
Current net prof -20,670 3,538 5,455
Loans 601,826 575,703 547,107
Deposits 567,460 587,207 604,343
Total assets 1,165,502 1,197,826 1,244,141
Number of employees 28,697
Network 808
domestic 764
foreign 44
Source: Mizuho Financial Group, Inc. (2005) Annual Report 2005
Like other Japanese banks, Mizuho suffered from extensive bad debts following the
bubble economy, and it had to accept a capital injection from the government. The red figures
for Current Net Profit in 2002 indicates the severity of the problem. However, since 2003 its
business performance has begun to recover, and the latest figures shows Mizuho has
achieved its highest net profit since the company was established. The bank's 2005 Annual
Report stated:
Mizuho entered into a new phase in its management strategies and shifted the
management focus toward expanding top-line growth. In line with this shift, each of
the group companies implemented their own strategies customized to suit each
customer segmentation and business feature. The group's focus has moved to a
future-minded and customers-oriented phase that will seek to gain support of
customers.
Accordingly, in April 2005, Mizuho announced a new business strategy, the "Channel
Discovery Plan," with the objective of making Mizuho a world-leading financial group.
Following its business portfolio strategy based on customer needs, the group will realign its
activities into three global groups: Global Corporate, Global Retail, and Global Asset &
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Wealth Management, each of which will be managed by Mizuho Bank, Mizuho Corporate
Bank, and Mizuho Trust and Banking Company, respectively. This corporate structure is
unique among the mega-banks. While other banks have a single entity covering retail and
corporate banking, Mizuho uses different entities. Although details are not available, its
corporate finance business, including small and medium-size companies, will be the bank's
core business.
3.3 The German Banking Industry
The four German banks described in the following sections dominate the German
banking industry in terms of revenue. According to 2001 statistical data from the German
central bank, these four banks together hold 16% of the total German market.
German banks have instituted a "universal banking system" that provides a full range
of financial business, including securities and insurance. The major banks have implemented
universal banking in order to optimize their business by cross selling products.
There are two other types of banks: state banks and savings banks. There are 16 state
banks, each owned by one of the 16 German states, and their purpose is to facilitate the
regional economy. Today, however, state banks are becoming more like private banks.
Savings banks are rooted in smaller cities, towns, and local communities. Their business is
focused on retail banking, and all savings banks are interconnected via a savings bank
network system.
From the standpoint of breadth of business, diversity, and scale, I will focus on the four
major banks, each described in the following sections.
3.3.1 Data Summary for Four Major German Banks
Table 3-2 shows a summarized comparison of the top four German banks.
Table 3-2 US $ in million
Deutche Dresdner HVB Commerz
Net Revenue 26,521 7,685 11,277 7,671
Interest income 23.6% 35.9% 60.7% 47.2%
Trustee fees 14.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Non-interest fees 28.7% 40.4% 30.5% 35.5%
Trading fees 29.3% 23.8% 7.7% 14.2%
Others 3.7% 0.0% 1.1% 3.1%
Net Income 2,991 31 -2,410 476
Total assets 1,016,482 634,028 565,554 514,104
Portion of Corporate Banking 60.6% 16.4% 28.7% 39.2%
Source: Annual Reports for FY2004 of Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, HVB and Commerzbank
The strength of Deutsche Bank is startling. Every bank provides full banking services,
but each bank's strategy is different from the others. Deutsche Bank focuses on investment
banking, which is supported by large profits from non-interest fees and a well-balanced
revenue structure.
Dresdner is also moving into investment banking because it has its own strong
investment banking entity. But its business size is much smaller than Deutsche Bank. It also
provides regular corporate banking services.
HVB's profit structure is similar to Japanese banks. The difference is its focus on
Central and Eastern European countries.
The figures for Commerzbank are similar to Dresdner Bank, but Commerzbank
emphasizes retail banking while Dresdner focuses on investment banking.
Unlike Japanese banks, German banks conduct their business based on strategies that
are intended to differentiate themselves from other competitors. They tend to bring in more
investment banking business. The figures provide graphic proof of the result of their different
strategies.
3.3.2 Analysis of Four Major German Banks
Deutsche Bank
The name "Deutsche Bank" means "German Bank" in English, and it has been the
leading bank in Germany for over 135 years. Deutsche Bank was founded in 1870 in Berlin
to transact a full range of banking businesses that would promote and facilitate trade relations
between Germany, other European countries, and overseas market. From 1880 to 1914 the
bank pursued promotional and investment activities. After World War II, Deutsche Bank was
divided into ten institutions that remained in place until 1959 when the bank was restructured
again.
Like Japanese banks, Deutsche Bank played an important role in supporting German
heavy industry. It focused primarily on the German market and it was not until 1976 that the
bank opened its first foreign branch in London. From the late 1980s, Deutsche Bank began to
acquire other European banks as a way to enhance its business throughout Europe.
US$ in million
Fiscal Year 2002 2003 2004
Net revenue 32,122 25,734 26,521
Interest income 8,695 7,075 6,270
Trustee fees 4,750 3,960 3,885
Non-interest fees 8,359 7,331 7,617
Trading fees 9,132 6,814 7,769
Others 1,186 554 979
Operating profit N/A N/A N/A
Current net rofit 480 1,652 2,991
Loans 202,437 175,385 164,976
Deposits 396,426 370,446 398,506
Total assets 917,610 972,373 1,016,482
Number of employees 65,417
Network 1,576
domestic 845
foreign 731
Number of customers (corporate) 56,434
(private and SM Corp.) in thousand 13,331
Source: Deutsche Bank AG (2005) Annual Review 2004
Deutsche Bank has three business divisions: Corporate and Investment Bank (CIB),
Private Clients and Assets Management (PCAM), and Corporate Investments (CI). If one
were to draw parallels with corporate banking in Japanese banks, CI could be called a kind of
corporate banking business. Yet the German unit emphasizes equity business rather than
conventional corporate finance such as loans, deposits, and other transactions.
Each profit source of net revenue illustrates the nature of the bank. The proportion of
revenues-interest income, non-interest income, and trading fees-are in approximately the
same range, which indicates profit sources are better balanced in the German banks than in
the Japanese banks. In other words, the investment banking business anchors the CIB
division.
Turning to business strategy, Deutsche Bank expands CIB in parallel with PCAM;
there is no priority between the two business divisions. In the 2004 Annual Report, four
strategic priorities were cited, two of which refer to the business divisions. One priority is
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"Capitalizing on global leadership in CIB," and the second is "Delivering profitable growth
in PCAM." This indicates that Deutsche Bank focuses on both these areas and will expand
their business worldwide.
At the same time, however, Josef Ackerman, CEO of Deutsche Bank announced, "We
are strengthening our regional management structure and have reaffirmed our absolute
commitment to our home market (Germany) with the creation of Management Committee
Germany." This indicates that Deutsche Bank is also planning to focus on becoming a more
global investment bank within the German market.
Dresdner Bank
Dresdner Bank, the second largest bank in Germany, was founded in 1872 in Dresden
by the transformation of a local private bank. Prior to the end of World War II, the bank
expanded its business throughout Germany by acquiring smaller local banks. After the war,
the bank changed its head office from Dresden (formerly in East Germany) to Frankfurt am
Main (formerly in West Germany).
Dresdner Bank began internationalizing in 1972 by opening its first overseas branch in
Singapore. When German reunification occurred in 1990, the bank expanded its local branch
network into East Germany and also into Eastern Europe, well ahead of other competitors. In
1995, Dresdner Bank took over Kleinwort Benson, a British investment bank, and it now
comprises one of Dresdner's core business units. In 2001, Dresdner Bank was acquired by
the major German insurance company Allianz.
US$ in million
Fiscal Year 2002 2003 2004
Net revenue 8,586 8,107 7,685
Interest income 3,556 3,127 2,758
Trustee fees 0 0 0
Non-interest fees 3,446 3,134 3,101
Trading fees 1,584 1,846 1,826
Others 0 0 0
Operating profit 0 0 0
Current net profit -852 -2,407 31
Loans 148,938 123,432 114,738
Deposits 76,672 83,223 84,652
Total assets 500,268 577,205 634,028
Number of employees 35,946
Network 1,576
domestic 911
foreign 58
Number of customers (corporate) 9,000
(private and SM Corp.) in thousand 5,250
Source: Dresdner Bank AG (2005) Financial Report Dresdner Bank Group 2004
Dresdner Bank has organized its business activities into four strategic divisions:
personal banking, private and business banking, corporate banking, and Dresdner Kleinwort
Wasserstein. This structure recorded a balanced distribution of operating income in 2004. In
FY 2004, 36% of operating income was attributable to net interest income, 40% to net fee
and non-interest fee income, and 24% to net trading. Although the proportion of non-interest
fees is higher than the other two profit categories, the profit structure is similar to that of
Deutsche Bank.
One significant difference is the regional profit share. Dresdner Bank earned 67% of its
operating profit from Germany and the remainder outside of Germany, mainly in European
countries. Dresdner Bank focuses primarily on German markets.
As a result of operating losses suffered from 2001 to 2003, the bank undertook
restructuring measures that led to the "New Dresdner Program," which focused on securing
its base, on disciplined costs, capital and risk management, and the successful development
of growth initiatives in all strategic business areas. Although business performance in 2004
Dresdner Bank Business Portfolio (Based on
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showed the first profit in three years, the profit level is well below that of Deutsche Bank. In
2002 the bank dropped from second position to fourth. Today it has come back as the
second-ranked bank in Germany. However, its COO announced that more effort is needed to
launch the next stage of profitable growth.
HVB Bank
Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank (HVB) was formed in 1997 through mergers with
Bayerische Vereinsbank (founded in 1869) and Bayerische Hypotheken und Wechsel Bank
(founded in 1835). Both banks are situated in Bavaria, the largest state in Germany. The
former was a regional bank that conducted commercial banking; the latter was authorized by
law to conduct real estate financing.
In 2000, HVB took over Bank Austria Creditanstalt, the major Austrian bank, which
was strong in the Central and Eastern European markets. After this merger, HVB exceeded
Dresdner Bank and was long second-ranked among German banks, although today it is
ranked third. In 2005, HVB was bought by an Italian bank, UniCredit, and it now belongs to
that group.
US$ in million
Fiscal Year 2002 2003 2004
Net revenue 11,586 12,240 11,277
Interest income 7,183 7,116 6,844
Trustee fees 0 0 0
Non-interest fees 3,233 3,382 3,442
Trading fees 952 992 869
Others 218 750 122
Operating profit -742 1,733 1,681
Current net profit -1,029 -2,955 -2,41.0
Loans 454,718 409,343 392,766
Deposits 177,986 169,778 174,786
Total assets 648,318 580,195 565,554
Number of employees 57,806
Network 2,036
domestic 681
foreign 1,355
Number of customers (corporate) N.A.
(private and SM Corp.) in thousand N.A.
Source: Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank Aktiengesellschaft (2005) Annual Report 2004 HVB Group
HVB Business Portfolio (Based on Operating
Performance)
HVB's business strategy is unique in that it focuses on retail and corporate banking in
Europe. Following its strategy of "Growing with Europe," HVB consolidated its market
position in core European regions - Germany, Austria, and Central/Eastern Europe - with the
aid of innovative products for private and corporate customers. The HVB network in Central
and Eastern Europe exceeds all of its German competitors, spanning 16 countries and serving
more than four million customers. HVB plans to open 200 new branches and continue to
increase its customer base. It relies primarily on organic growth in central and eastern Europe.
Table 3.3 shows the strength of its European market.
Table 3-3
Segment by region
I Germanyi Austria Other W.Europe CEE Americas Asia
49.8% 26.4% 7.0% 13.6% 2.7% 0.6%
Regarding its business portfolio, the retail and corporate banking businesses have
almost the same weight on total operating income. Due to the difficult German real estate
market, the real estate portion of the business (HVB's original business) is way down. Note
that HVB utilizes a specific category for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) business, in
addition to other segments, which indicates the importance of that region to HVB's overall
strategy.
In contrast, HBV's business performance is not positive. The bank has suffered net
losses since 2002, and the current net loss has not diminished. The reason is the heavy burden
of bad debt in the real estate business. In 2005, HVB decided to restructure its German
business, and will transfer its workout portfolio for the entire German real estate business to
its restructuring segment.
Mr. Rampl, CEO of HVB, stated in HVB's 2004 Annual Report:
For the sake of our Bank's future viability, we had to free ourselves by drawing a
line under the troublesome subject of our legacy burdens in the real estate business.
---- Now we can remove a significant portion of the risk form our future income
statement and concentrate our resources entirely on profitable new business.
HVB is still in the process of transforming itself by moving out from Germany and
into the Eastern markets.
Commerzbank
Commerzbank was founded as Commerz und Disconto Bank in Hamburg in 1870. The
youngest bank among top four banks (at 135 years old), it is ranked fourth among German
banks. In 1958, it was reorganized, and in the earlyl1970s, it moved its head office to
Frankfurt am Main.
Its activities are focused on the customer. Its business is organized in two divisions to
achieve mutual synergies: Retail Banking and Asset Management, and Corporate and
Investment Banking. The bank maintains both private customer banks and corporate
customer banks. The pie chart below shows that the two main business lines equally support
the bank's business performance.
US$ in million
Fiscal Year 2002 2003 2004
Net revenue 8,068 7,446 7,671
Interest income 3,791 3,359 3,619
Trustee fees 0 0 0
Non-interest fees 2,565 2,585 2,723
Trading fees 645 1,244 1,089
Others 1,067 259 241
Operating profit; 232 676 1,262
Current net profit -361 -2,807 476
Loans 169,241 158,546 151,482
Deposits 115,797 121,000 127,127
Total assets 510,782 461,718 514,104
Number of employees 32,820
Network 965
domestic 798
foreign 167
Number of customers 7,880,000
Source: Commerzbank AG (2005) Annual Report 2004
Commerzbank focuses its business on Germany where, as an integrated provider of
financial services, it maintains a nationwide branch network to provide advice to customers
and distribute its products. Its corporate business focuses on Western, Central, and Eastern
Europe as its core markets. Outside of Europe, North America is the bank's most important
and profitable region. Just as Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank did, this bank opened
overseas branches in the 1970s, with its first branch in Chicago. It primary purpose in the
U.S. is to serve German companies located in the U.S.
To strengthen its other core businesses, Commerzbank has a subsidiary in Luxembourg
and is establishing private banking units outside of Germany. The bank earns 78% of its
operating profit in Europe, including Germany (no figures are disclosed for only its market in
Germany).
Considering these figures, like Dresdner Bank and HVB, Commerzbank is also a
Europe-driven bank. However, the difference is that this bank focuses on retail banking in
Europe. The bank's 2004 Annual Report highlighted its history of retail banking as an
example of leveraging the Luxembourg subsidiary as a strategic entity.
Comparing Commerzbank with the other three German banks, Commerzbank's
strategy is not as clear. It seeks to strengthen its brand and aims to become the best bank in
Central Europe. However, it is difficult to identify a clear strategy for how the bank plans to
achieve this target.
3.4 The Banking Industry in the United States
U.S. banks can be divided into four groups: community banks, regional banks, super-
regional banks, and money center banks. There is no rigid category of specific financial data
that identifies each group. As a result of the many mergers in the last decade, the number of
U.S. banks has decreased. Still, 95% of all banks are small community banks.
Money center banks have diversified business units with both nationwide and
international focus and a huge branch network. These banks have the largest total assets and
are the top banks in the U.S. Therefore, money center banks are comparable to Japanese and
German top banks as described in the previous sections.
3.4.1 Summary of Three Major U.S. Banks
Table 3-4
US $ 
in million
Citigroup JPM Chase BOA
Net Revenue 86,190 43,097 48,894
Interest income 51.8% 38.9% 58.9%
Trustee fees 7.9% 18.5% 0.0%
Non-interest fees 24.1% 32.3% 37.6%
Trading fees 4.4% 8.4% 1.8%
Others 11.8% 1.9% 1.8%
Net Income 17,046 4,414 14,143
Total assets 1,484,101 1.157,248 1,110,457
Portion of Corporate Banking 12.0% 5.1% 13.5%
Source: Annual Reports for FY2004 of Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase and Bank of America
The three banks to be discussed here represent the top three U.S. banks. In both
business scale and net profit, they exceed the Japanese and German banks. The net revenue
of the U.S. banks is similar in structure to the Japanese banks, the proportion of interest
revenue is relatively high, and the percentage of non-interest fees is approximately the same
as Japanese banks.
The most notable difference between these American banks and their Japanese and
German counterparts is the magnitude of their corporate banking business, which is lower
than that of the other two nations' banks. This means the U.S banks focus much more on
retail banking.
Among the U.S. examples, each bank's strategy is significantly different. Citigroup
focuses on global retail banking. JP Morgan Chase focuses on both investment banking and
retail banking equally. Bank of America is more a domestic bank than international.
3.4.2 Analysis of Three Major U.S. Banks
Citigroup
Citigroup, the largest and most famous bank in the world, was founded in 1812 as City
Bank of New York. In 1894, City Bank was already the largest bank in the U.S. It expanded
into Asia, Europe, and India in 1902. In 1929, it became the largest commercial bank in the
world, and its expansion accelerated following several mergers. In the 1960s Citibank
entered retail banking, with a special focus on the credit card business.
As of the end of FY 2004, Citigroup maintains nine distinct product lines within four
business groups: Global Consumer (GC), Corporate and Investment Bank (CIB), Global
Wealth Management, and Global Investment Management. The bank's strategic goal is to
expand internationally, to continue growing its consumer business, and to ensure that its
corporate and investment banking business is best in class-goals that are clearly described
in the bank's 2004 Annual Report.
US$ in million
Fiscal Year 2002 2003 2004
Net revenue 71,308 77,442 86,190
Interest income 37,691 39,776 44,623
Trustee fees 5,146 5,665 6,845
Non-interest fees 18,668 20,063 20,765
Trading fees 4,513 5,120 3,756
Others 5,290 6,818 10,201
Operating profit 0 0 0
Current net profit 15,276 17,853 17,046
Loans 447,805 465,363 548,560
Deposits 430,895 474,015 562,061
Total assets 1,097,590 1,264,032 1,484,101
Number of employees 275,000
Network N.A.
domestic N.A.
foreign N.A.
Number of customers (thousand) 100,000
Source: Citigroup Inc. (2005) 2004 Annual Report
The pie chart shows how each business line aligns with the bank's overall strategy.
There is no doubt that the GC business is the bank's strongest revenue engine, with CIB the
second core business-even though it produces five times less than the GC segment.
Nevertheless, it remains highly competitive against other international banks. GC is
comprised of two products lines: Capital Markets and Banking, and Transaction Services.
Unlike Japanese banks, Capital Markets and Banking is similar to investment banking. At
end of the fourth quarter of 2004, Citibank became the first financial institution to achieve
number one ranking in all four major investment banking products.
Transaction Services means on-line banking services for corporate customers. This
bank is the world leader in online banking, combining state-of-the-art products with its
worldwide network.
CITI Business Portfolio (Based on Net Income)___ ~ 1
Citigroup's business portfolio is quite different from Japanese and German banks.
While it conducts business worldwide, the retail banking business is dominant.
Geographically, 47% of total net income comes from North America, the bank's home
market (see Table 3-5). Yet 53%--over half of net income-is generated outside of North
America. Roughly speaking, one-third comes from regions other than North America. As
Japan has almost a 5% share, it can be said that Citigroup puts its first priority on the
Japanese market among Asian countries.
Table 3-5
Net Income - Regional View
North EMEA (Europe, LatinMexico Middle East and Japan Asia AiAmerica Af1ica) America
47.2% 10.3% 14.3% 4.7% 16.1% 7.4%
JP Mor2an Chase
As its name indicates, JP Morgan Chase was established through several mergers,
although two were responsible for its present name: the former investment bank of JP
Morgan and the commercial bank Chase Manhattan Bank. That merger united two prominent
U.S. financial service companies, whose joint legacy stretched back more than 200 years
from the founding of its earliest predecessor (The Bank of Manhattan Company) in 1799.
Today the bank's headquarters are located in New York, but its commercial banking
headquarters are in Chicago.
Mergers have not stopped, however, with the latest one being the acquisition of Bank
One in 2004. Based on background of mergers, this bank uses the two brands names to define
its business areas. JP Morgan handles investment banking, asset management, and private
banking; Chase handles retail and commercial banking. Net revenues from Chase are almost
equal to that of JP Morgan.
US$ in million
Fiscal Year 2002 2003 2004
Net revenue 29,614 33,384 43,097
Interest income 12,178 12,965 16,761
Trustee fees 5,754 5,906 7,967
Non-interest fees 8,549 9,485 13,927
Trading fees 2,675 4,427 3,612
Others 458 601 830
Operating profit 0 0 0
Current net profit 1,663 6,668 4,414
Loans 216,364 214,766 402,114
Deposits 304,753 326,492 521,456
Total assets 758,800 770,912 1,157,248
Number of employees 160,968
Network N.A.
domestic N.A.
foreign N.A.
Number of customers 94,000
Source: JP Morgan Chase & Co. (2005) 2004 Annual Report
Although no data is provided that shows regional revenues, the bank's net revenues
from investments are given in its 2004 Annual Report, which shows 54% from the Americas,
32% from Europe, and 13% from Asia/Pacific. Comparing this data with Citigroup's GCIB
division, there are slight differences: 64% from the Americas, 11% from Europe/Africa, and
25% from Asia. As far as the investment banking business is concerned, JP Morgan Chase
depends on considerable revenue from outside the Americas. However, both divisions have
the same strategy - to expand their business globally.
The bank's strategy is to invent organic growth; expand consumer banking,
aggressively fund new investment banking, intensify its card business, and increase private
banking. The goal is to produce equally balanced business areas simultaneously.
In terms of business scale and business portfolio, JP Morgan Chase is smaller but more
diverse than Citigroup. However, their commonality is worldwide business, and there is little
JP Morgan Chase Business Portfolio (Based on Net
Revenue)
emphasis on corporate banking.
Bank of America
Bank of America (BOA) was established in 1998 as a result of the largest merger at the
time, between Nations Bank and Bank America, both of which are over 100 years old.
US$ in million
Fiscal Year 2002 2003 2004
Net revenue 34,503 37,914 48,894
Interest income 20,923 21,464 28,797
Trustee fees 0 0 0
Non-interest fees 12,159 14,914 18,365
Trading fees 778 409 869
Others 643 1,127 863
Operating profit 0 0 0
Current net profit 9,249 10,810 14,143
Loans & Lease 342,755 371,463 521,837
Deposits 386,458 414,113 618,570
Total assets 660,951 719,483 1,110,457
Number of employees 177,236
Network 5,879
domestic 5,844
foreign 35
Number of customers N.A.
Source: Bank of America Corporation (2005) Portrait of a Bank 2004 Annual Report
As the financial data shows, net revenues and total assets are similar to JP Morgan
Chase. Also, BOA's business portfolio is divided into four business units, which the bank
recognizes as its core business lines.
This bank's goal is to expand its global business, and it is presumed that every business
unit is named "Global" for that reason - like other two American banks discussed here.
However, Table 3.6 confirms that the majority of BOA revenues are derived from the U.S.
market.
BOA Business Portfolio (Based on Net Revenue)
Table 3-6
Net Revenue by geographic area
Domestic EMEA (Europe, LatinAsia Middle East and(incl.Canada) Africa) America
94.4% 1.4% 2.3% 1.8%
In 2004, 94.4% of net revenues were earned in the domestic market, with the
remainder coming from outside the U.S. BOA's 2004 Annual Report stated that the bank's
strategy is to be a nationwide, universal bank for consumers and small businesses, and to be a
full-service corporate and investment bank with global capabilities for its commercial and
corporate clients. Yet, BOA's direction is significantly different from other top U.S. banks.
Based on this, BOA can be categorized as the largest regional bank in the U.S.
3.5 Summary and Conclusion
3.5.1 Summary
Figure 3-1 illustrates the position of each bank in terms of interest income and
non-interest income-one indicator of the products from which each bank earns its profit.
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The high ratio of interest income indicates that the bank emphasizes its conventional
banking business associated with loans and deposits. On the other hand, a high ratio of
non-interest income signals that the business is focused on a fee business driven by
investment banking. The Japanese banks are in a cluster together, signaling high-interest
income and low non-interest income. One can see little difference among the banks, and all
are focused on conventional business.
In contrast, German banks are much more scattered. HVB is closer to the Japanese
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banks, while the other three banks are different. This means that each German bank's income
source is different, and they pursue different strategies.
Like the German banks, the three U.S. banks are different again. Interestingly, Citibank
is closer to the Japanese cluster as far as the ratio of income sources, although its strategy is
totally different from Japanese banks as I will show later.
Figure 3-2 depicts each bank's position vis-A-vis the relation between corporate
banking and retail banking. This indicates target customers.
Figure 3-2
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As the differences in the nature of business between corporate banking and retail
banking is significant, one can distinguish the bank's target customers. If a bank focuses on
retail banking, its target is individual and private customers, and the bank tends to offer
mortgage loans, card loans, and savings deposits. A bank that focuses on corporate banking
works primarily with corporate customers and institutional investors. It provides investment
banking business in addition to basic commercial banking services.
The figure highlights the characteristic tendencies of the thee national banks. Japanese
banks focus more on corporate banking. Although Mizuho's retail banking is more than the
other three Japanese banks, I assume the ratio is lower because the bank did not disclose
more detailed segmentation figures.
U.S. banks are more retail-banking-driven. It is interesting to me that when it comes to
major U.S. banks, most are international, global banks, leading investment banks. But the
data in Figure 3.2 shows that major U.S. banks earn more profit in investment banking with a
much larger volume than Japanese and German banks.
German banks fall between U.S. and Japanese banks. Their business portfolio is
balanced. However, each bank's position is closer either to Japanese banks or to U.S. banks It
is quite possible that Deutsche Bank focuses on corporate banking and HVB focuses more on
private customers.
Figure 3-3 shows the geographic distribution of net income for each bank. This
highlights each bank's strategy from a horizontal angle, while the previous two figures
explain it vertically.
One can see clearly where each bank earns its profit. Generally, each national bank
earns the largest profit from its home country, but the percentages are quite different.
Japanese banks gather 82.3% of their profit from the Japanese market. U.S. banks earn their
profit in the U.S. market including Canada, but the amount is less than Japanese banks.
However, for German banks, their profit from the German market is less than 50%. The
reason is that German banks earn more than one-third of their profit from other European
markets. This means for German banks it is not necessary to distinguish their home country
from other European countries. They consider the German market and other European market
as inseparable.
Figure 3-3
Proportion of Net Income by Geographical area
Japanese Banks German Banks*
Japan 82.3% Germany 47.8%
Asia 3.2% Europe 34.7%
America 9.5% America 13.1%
Europe 3.2% Asia 4.4%
* Except for Commerzbank
**Except for JP Morgan Chase
BTM
Japan 69.4%
Asia 4..4%
America 18.0%
Europe 8.1%
US Banks**
N.America
Latin America
Europe
Asia
One characteristic of the data for Japanese banks is the low ratio of income from Asia.
In contrast to the Germans and Americans, the Japanese do not to reap their large profits from
the Asian market although they are located geographically closest to their home market.
However, from a data perspective, the closest market for Japanese banks is the U.S. market.
U.S. banks, too, earn more than 10% from the Asian market, which is somewhat larger than
that of their neighbor countries. It indicates how U.S. banks recognize the potential of the
70.8%
9.8%
8.3%
11.1%
7
EuropeAsia
growing Asian markets rather than the Latin America market.
When considering BTM specifically, its ratio is more diverse than average, and it is
similar to the U.S. banks. In this sense, BTM is the most international Japanese bank,
although its strategies are totally different from those of U.S. banks.
3.5.2 Characterization
The three national banks can be characterized as below.
Japanese Banks
/ Corporate banking oriented
/ Conventional commercial banking oriented
V Emphasizing home market, not so international
" Each bank strategy has little differences
German Banks
V Corporate banking and retail banking are well balanced
/ Commercial banking and investment banking are balanced
V" Emphasize the European market including Germany
V Each bank has a different strategy
U.S. Banks
/ Retail banking oriented
/ Commercial banking and investment banking are balanced
/ Major market is home country, but geographically diversified
/ Each bank has a different strategy
In the following chapters, I will analyze to what extent these characteristics are aligned
to cultural issues in each country using data acquired from my interviews.
CHAPTER 4
A Study of Japanese Banks
In this chapter I will describe several aspects of the organization of Japanese banks and
their strategies. To the best of my knowledge, the points I emphasize in this chapter do not
appear in the published literature. My purpose is to shed light on the thinking behind building
the organization and conducting business. This study is based on interviews held with seven
Japanese bank officers, six of whom now work at the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (BTM); the
other works at Mizuho Corporate Bank. Discussion in this chapter focuses mainly on BTM
but I believe it accurately represents the organization and organizational culture of most
Japanese banks.
4.1 Organization
4.1.1 Structure
The structure of Japanese banks does not differ markedly. Each Japanese bank
typically has several business units. In the case of BTM, there are eight business units that
appear to be on the same level superficially on the organization structure chart (see Figure
4-1). However, in reality the power of each business unit is very different. Business units that
take care of corporate customers, such as Global Corporate and Commercial have the
strongest power because they earn the largest portion of the profits for the commercial
banking business. In contrast, a non-profit business unit like Operation and Systems has the
least power because it only spends money and does not earn a profit. The Treasury and
Investment Banking units are an essential part of the banking business, and their performance
contributes directly to the bank's profit. Yet Global Corporate and Commercial is regarded as
superior to Treasury and Investment Banking.
Figure 4-1
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Source: Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, Inc. (2005) Annual Report 2005
4.1.2 Corporate Banking Units
The reason why corporate banking units have greater power can be explained by the
so-called "main bank system," which exists only in Japan. "Main bank" refers to the bank
that has the closest relationship with a company; this bank reaps the largest share of the
profits to be made through its banking relationship with the company, and the main bank has
the most power to influence the company. Following World War II, the decision about how to
finance investment funds was crucial for Japanese industries. Since there was no capital
market, Japanese companies had to borrow funds for investment from banks. Thus banks
played the key role for company growth at the time. Main banks lent money and acquired
--
i
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deposits from firms. As a result of this process, the main bank became defined as a major
leading bank, which holds the major share of funds lent to companies. Details of the main
bank system will be further described in Section 4.4.3.
Each company has a main bank, and most of the bank's business comes through this
main bank, which is usually very profitable and the growth engine of the bank. The business
unit that plays the role of a main bank is the most valued in the bank, and at BTM, this unit is
Global Corporate and Commercial. Therefore, the most qualified people, who have
demonstrated significant achievement, are placed in this main bank unit and those units are
ranked even above other profit-earning business units. Opportunities for promotion are
greater, and salaries are higher in the main bank unit than for other business unit employees.
Mr. Asano explains:
When I decided to work for my bank 17 years ago, I compared banks and security
companies. But at the time there was an image that banks were high-status
corporations while security companies seemed to be stock jobbers or a bucket shop.
Almost the same notion was found in the bank. People did not like to do retail
banking because it was not profitable, more risky, and more trouble with individual
customers.
This comment indicates that there is an invisible hierarchy in the organization, and the
distance between each layer in the hierarchy is not small. In BTM, bank officers who are
responsible for the largest companies at headquarters (Honbu) in Tokyo are regarded as elites.
Employees aim to work in the elite position, but of course that is not easy. Thus, the
historical legacy is that to work in corporate banking in the organization gives the most
status.
4.1.3 System Services and Operations Services Business Units
In contrast, the system services and operations services units are ranked by these in the
organization at the lowest level. Of course, many qualified people work in these units, and
the bank is continually seeking additional skilled employees. However, it is also true that
employees who have been judged to be unqualified for work in other business units are often
transferred to these two business units. Such transfers are often referred to as "matching the
right talent with the right job," but in truth it is a kind of demotion.
Even though the organization is well-structured, the success of every project depends
on people. At BTM, there is no matching of the right talent with the right job. And when a
person not suited for his/her job, the inevitable transfer to some other unit occurs because
most Japanese businesses still observe the tradition of life-time employment. As a result, the
bank continues to keep unqualified people working somewhere in the bank, and most of them
end up in the Systems Services or Operations Services units. Life-time employment will be
explained in a later section.
Mr. Suzuki of BTM commented:
I see a culture in the bank where the back office is looked down on, and people
admire the front officer who makes a profit through business with big companies.
Some system features of our banking system are behind those offoreign banks and
it constrains business promotions. Morgan Stanley in Tokyo has developed a new
system to meeting customer needs. As far as I know, one-fourth of its employees are
IT people, and the IT division is highly regarded That is very diferent from us.
This explanation implies a business unit hierarchy in the bank that varies across
organizations. But within the variance of ranking, each bank maintains a status hierarchy.
4.2 Human Resources
4.2.1 Human Resource Development System
Responsibility for human resources (HR) is centralized in a human resource office.
While each business unit has its own human resource office, all HR employees are located on
the same floor, work together, and share information about employees.
The fundamental concept underlying human resource development in Japan is
"on-the-job-training" (OJT). At BTM, there are several employment categories, each
dependent on the employee's education path. Most students graduating from four-year
universities are hired as future bank officers. The bank has its own training program. It rarely
uses external training programs nor does it send people to external educational institutions. In
the first two or three years, all freshmen employees are allocated to small branches where
they become familiar with all aspects of the banking business available at the branch.
After the initial training period, each employee's abilities and skills are evaluated by
the human resource office, and then the employee is assigned to a business unit. It is
customary that salaries and bonuses for employees who start work in the same year (called
"doki") do not differ significantly until they are promoted to manager (almost eight years
after entering the company). The human resource office tends to make as few distinctions as
possible among the younger bank officers. Some interviewees call this system "egalitarian,"
and others called it "communitarian." Every interviewee agreed that Japanese banks to tend
to promote people as equally as possible.
The Life-time Employment System
It is often said that there is a life-time employment system in Japan. Yet strictly
speaking, Japan has no life-time employment system because no Japanese company has a
life-time employment contract. Japanese laws allow companies to fire their employees for
reasonable cause. Before World War II, and during the 1940s and 1950s, there were many
lay-offs. Again in late 1970, the oil crisis triggered drastic lay-offs and there were no
guarantees of employment. Thus, it cannot be said there is such a "system" in Japan. In
reality, however, the tradition of life-time employment exists as a custom and an ideal system,
and the banking industry is no exception.
How did this custom develop? After the war, demand for labor increased as the
Japanese economy grew dramatically over the next 20 years, and companies also grew
rapidly. At the time the number of younger males was quite low. Due to the chronic lack of
laborers, companies began to hire many young new employees in April every year-the so-
called "spring hires." In order to train these young freshmen quickly, Japanese companies
built internal training programs and developed a promotion system. Soon the notion began to
spread that there was no risk of being fired after once entering a company and life-time
employment became a household word. Most Japanese companies continue to observe this
custom, or at the very least are reluctant to fire employee, preferring to keep employees for as
long as possible.
4.2.2 Performance Evaluation System
Every person I interviewed agreed that the notion of life-time employment still exists
in most banks. Employees are retained as long as possible. To enable this, two hierarchical
structures are used. One is the typical organization hierarchy shown in Figure 4-2. This
structure is linked to the titles and positions of all employees. Every time an employee moves
up the ladder, he' gets a promotion, but as long as he remains in the same layer, there is little
difference in salaries and bonuses. Yet officers are evaluated on their performance by their
supervisors who can recommend a subordinate's promotion to the human resources office,
which makes the final decision in a highly centralized process.
Figure 4-2 Bank organization structure
Organizational
Business unit
Once an officer is promoted and moves up in the organization, he receives a higher
salary and larger bonuses. The difference between a manager and an officer is relatively high.
However, if an officer is evaluated as not sufficiently skilled, he could be transferred to
another business unit rather than be demoted within the same unit. Such a transfer is in fact a
1 While my preference would be to use he/she in recognition of the important role of women in the
workforce today, the reality is that in Japanese banking the overwhelming majority of employees are men. Thus
I have used the pronoun "he" because it more closely represents today's situation in banking.
demotion because the business units are also in a hierarchy and the business unit where he
will be transferred will be lower than his previous unit. Therefore, a transfer to another
business unit more often means moving from an upper level to a lower level. There are cases
in which an employee changes from a lower level to an upper level, but such moves are rare.
A transfer has some merit for an officer who must change to another business unit.
First, his salary level will remain virtually unchanged because his title is unchanged. He does
not have to worry about being asked to leave the company because of life-time employment
as the unspoken consensus. Second, he will find that officers in his new workplace have
similar careers and his new group consists of people similar to him. He will feel confident
because there is no apparent "difference" between himself and his co-workers. One negative
thing is that he has to accept the fact that he has little chance for a big promotion. When he
accepts that, however, he will be happier.This system was understood by all interviewees.
Mr. Enomoto explained it further:
Regarding the appraisal system, we have to set our goals on a semi-annual basis
and they should be the kind that can be quantified and measured If the quantified
goal is achieved, it is clear to everyone. But there are some goals that I wonder how
to measure, such as "strengthen customer relationships, " "control the project more
strictly, " and so on. Unfortunately, the correlation between achievement and
promotion is sometimes not clear Some people complain about this and I know this
is bad in terms of convincing people to achieve a goal. Overall, however I think it
works well. The bank tries to evaluate people over the long term and from various
angles. Figures and measurable achievements are important for the short term, but
do not represent a worker 's entire value.... There is definitely a culture that we
prefer team-oriented work values. The evaluation system is also results in keeping
people equal in the firm.
4.3 Unions
Like most Japanese banks, BTM has its own union. Union members come from all
levels of employees ranging from clerks to managers at lower levels who do not have the
possibility of becoming internal board members. Most employees assume that board
members are elected annually and that board members change after one year. The union's
executive office is expected to optimize economic conditions and welfare programs for all
union members and negotiate with bank executives to obtain benefits and better pay for all
union members from the bank.
In reality, the members of the union executive office are appointed by the bank. If they
finish their work as a union executive officer without any major problems, they usually
receive a good promotion after one year. Typically they go to the planning section or to
corporate finance as an officer, or become senior managers of a large corporate finance
branch-jobs that are perceived to be in the superior layer of the business unit's hierarchy.
Few people return to the systems service and operations service business units. Why? The
union executive office is used as a "checkpoint" to decide whether a selected employee will
be promoted by the bank. In other words, it is almost guaranteed that they will get a
promotion at the end of their assignment in the union, especially if they prove to be good at
obtaining consensus from union members in line with the bank's preferences. There are no
written or clearly explained rules about the relationships between the bank and the union
executive office, but there is an implicit understanding.
Mr. Suzuki and Mr. Otsubo were previous members of the union executive office.
They told me:
We cannot deny that people who worked in the executive office of the union tended
to have more chance to be promoted Everyone knows how the system works. We
also know that the union executive office is called the "second human resource
office. "But even if we fight aggressively against the bank in order to obtain better
pay it might not produce good results. In the end, people know it does not make
sense. It is a kind of "give and take" relationship. The bank raises salary as much
as possible even though the percentage is not large. So we [the union executive
office] try to persuade all union members that aggressive opinions from the union
members cause concerns among bank executives and upsets routine bank
operations. Harsh negotiation produces little benefit to union members.
This is a good example of collectivism and the power of distance. In terms of
collectivism, the priority of both the bank and the union is a compromise result for the group
and the bank rather than negotiations about better conditions. The bank uses the union
executive office to control the union members. The system works because the human
resource office is ranked among the top layer of the bank's organizational hierarchy, and
people in BTM perceive the power distance at this part of the hierarchical structure.
4.4 Strategy
4.4.1 Target Customers
What kind of customers do banks target? The answer is a key issue that sheds light on
the banks' cultural background. In the case of BTM, it is clear that the bank focuses on
banking with Japanese companies, even though it has more than 400 overseas branches. This
does not mean that BTM does not seek non-Japanese companies; however, but the amount of
corporate banking business with non-Japanese firms is small. In terms of retail banking,
BTM does not conduct retail banking abroad. When it comes to retail banking in BTM, it is
synonymous with domestic business.
Mr. Suzuki, who now works as corporate relations officer at the head office in Tokyo
said that BTM's CEO announced that the bank's international strategy was to support
Japanese companies in other countries. This aligns with my own work experience in
Germany where BTM branches there maintain only a few employees to cover blue-chip
German companies.
In my interview with Mr. Asano, who works at BTM's DiUsseldorf branch, he said that
the bank's strategy for all of Europe is no different from what the BTM German branches are
doing, and that BTM's major main customers are Japanese firms doing business in Europe.
Mr. Murakami, corporate relationship manager in the New York branch said:
All of my clients are Japanese customers and almost all counter parties are
Japanese, so I do not have to communicate in English. The only time I have to talk
to somebody in English is when I talk with clerks in the back office. The New York
branch is the one of the largest overseas branch in BTM. It operates a full banking
business with approximately 2,000 employees. It has the largest non-Japanese
corporate banking department, but the number of employees who are engaged in
U.S corporate banking and the business volume is very low in comparison with
banking conducted with Japanese firms.
Mr. Takeuchi, of Mizuho Financial Group, said that its strategy is more focused on
domestic. Indeed, while BTM earned around 70% of its revenue from the domestic market,
82% of Mizuho's revenues depend on the Japanese market (2004 annual reports of BTM and
Mizuho). Among major Japanese banks, BTM appears to be the most international bank, but
its business nature actually is not especially global.
This implies that the purpose of major Japanese banks' overseas branches is to follow
Japanese companies that are also their main customers in Japan. It is clear that they do not
establish overseas branches in order to follow non-Japanese customers.
4.4.2 Customer Relations
Another difference among the Japanese banks is how each maintains their customer
relationships. Every national bank has a customer relations manager, and there is no
objection to maintaining close relationships with customers in order to enhance the banking
business. However, there are major differences in the way to maintain and think about such
relationships. I believe these differences highlight each bank's organization culture.
For Japanese banks, the foundation of relationships is very much focused on "give and
take" and "long-term relationships." In many cases, important decisions depend on these two
factors. Japanese banks certainly operate their business based on internal rules, but how
rigorously such rules are applied differs from other national banks and indicates the
characteristic behavior of Japanese banks. The degree to which Japanese banks place great
priority on qualitative factors rather than quantitative is much greater than German and U.S.
banks. Often, such decisions by the Germans or U.S. banks appear to lack logic.
Mr. Suzuki explained:
The term "relation" sometimes carries very strong power when making decisions.
One example is pricing. Loan margin is diferent from a company ' rating risk
[each bank has an internal risk rating for credit, for example, 1 to 10 where 1 is the
lowest risk]. If a well-known company has a risk rating of 6, we have to take 100
points as margin according to the rule. In many cases, we compete with other banks,
and some provide the same financial product only with 50 points, i.e. half of our
price. Our rule does not allow us to offer such low margins, but the customer
requests us to consider their long relationship with us and to reduce the margin to
the same level of our competitors. Otherwise the customer will shift his business to
the competitor In this case, BTM usually does not reject the customer 's request
because BTM can expect other business from that customer in the future as long as
it maintains its relationship with BTM. For customers, the situation is the same.
Many companies borrow money from banks only to maintain their relationship with
the bank, and leave the same amount of money in deposit. This money does not have
any economic meaning for the company.
These two examples are evidence of the value of long-term relationships for both
banks and companies. And both of them expect to take some compensation if something is
given.
Mr. Suzuki cited another example of different policies between Japanese banks and
foreign banks. A few Japanese banks (including BTM) lent money to a famous food company
to establish as joint venture with a major Japanese and European food company. Its business
has not gone well, and its balance sheet looks shows a major capital deficit. HSBC bank
entered the credit business with twice higher margin than Japanese banks by utilizing their
relationship with the European parent company. the new bank entrant withdrew its credit in
short time because of the company's bad financial condition, while the Japanese banks
continued to lend money with low margins. It is assumed that HSBC performed solely
according to its internal credit policy because it made logical sense. For Japanese banks
relationships exceed pricing rules.
4.4.3 Main Bank System
Considering the relationship between Japanese banks and businesses, the main bank
system plays an important role in Japan, and also exemplifies one of the common
characteristics of Japanese banks. Such a main bank system does not exist in the U.S. or
Germany. I will describe it below.
In the main bank system, one bank is called the "main bank" and it provides all
banking functions to businesses, and it controls the largest share of each company's banking
business. That share may differ from company to company, but normally it ranges from 30%
to 60% of a company's banking business. The main bank also provides the largest share of
money lending. In another words, it is a company's largest creditor. Its priority is to provide
banking services for many companies and as such, it wields great influence over many
corporations.
Like life-time employment, there is no written contract or rules regarding the main
bank system. Companies usually do not appoint their main bank; rather, it is based on a long-
term historical relationship. Legally, the standardized general business agreement, which all
customers-including businesses-sign when they open an account, gives the bank its legal
status as the major creditor.
Following World War II, since there was little in the way of capital markets or
investors, Japanese companies were unable to finance their investment funds directly from a
capital market. However, heavy industry in Japan grew rapidly after the war and there was
strong demand for investment funds. At this stage, Japanese banks played an important role
as the key institution lending money to meet the financing demand of companies and
facilitate the growth of Japanese industry. This is how the main bank of each company
originated.
The main bank system helps each company serve its public owner or shareholder
interests if CEOs are unable to do so, because the bank is an interested third party and can
monitor corporate decisions from a stakeholder perspective. Even if the government and/or
public agencies lack the wisdom and capacity, the main bank functions to guide the company
along the right financial pathway. Major Japanese companies gave their main bank the power
to negotiate with the government and sometimes the bank supported the company by
assuming some of the risk of rebuilding after the war.
In this system, the nature of the lending by the main bank is like "pseudo capital"
rather than a normal credit asset, and this is the main bank's source of power. As a major
creditor, the main bank can give important advice to the company's board members as they
make decisions. In the event that the company's business does not go well, the main bank
might forgive the company's debt to prevent it from going into bankruptcy or to avoid social
sacrifices such as layoffs.
Every other non-main bank with which a company has a banking business that
monitors the main bank's behavior and makes its credit decision based on the main bank's
moves. Hence, if a main bank withdraws its loan from a company, that action has an
enormous impact on other banks, and many of them will withdraw their credit as well. That
means the company will go into bankruptcy unless it finds a new main bank. Becoming a
company's main bank means assuming business risk for the long term. Thus, there is a tacit
assumption that the main bank will be given special privileges in the form of more profitable
business from the company that it supports (by Mr. Asano).
This main bank system has created considerable "give and take" and long-term
relationships because every Japanese bank is the main bank of several companies. There is no
bank that performs only as a non-main bank in Japan.
Mr. Enomoto commented on the main bank system:
There is argument about the effectiveness of main bank system and some people are
saying such system is behind the times. Considering the renewal of corporate law
nowadays, it reflects much about the US corporate law and reduces the degrees of
security for creditors. It has negative impact on main banks because current bank 's
general agreement is only the legal stronghold of the banks acting as main banks. I
am wondering the measure of this renewal will disrupt the main bank systems
because it is introduced by disregarding the current factual situation. Main bank
system will change, but we are Japanese banks and I am not sure whether we will
be the banks like other foreign banks.
4.4.4 Risk Taking
When evaluating risk, Japanese banks have an internal evaluation system and metrics
that are similar to those of other foreign banks. It is useful, however, to analyze the way
Japanese banks think about taking risk compared with banks in other countries.
Japanese banks are highly risk averse when it comes to conducting banking business.
My own experience convinces me of this point, and the interviews substantiate this point. For
example, Mr. Enomoto explained:
Japanese banks do not take risks. They believe that no loss is allowed Giving credit
is a normal business function, such as taking a mortgage collateral for credit.
During the bubble economy, when the value of real estate was continuing to
increase, taking mortgage collateral brought no risk to the banks for the credit,
assuming that real estate prices would continue to rise. As you know, though, prices
crashed after the collapse of the bubble economy. But even today, our bank
constantly thinks of ways to hedge risk There is little room to make bold decision if
they involve risk.
Mr. Suzuki added:
Although we conduct investment banking, it difers from investment banking in U.S.
and European banks. We try to earn fees without taking risk, but instead based on a
longstanding relationship. How can you make profit without risk? Foreign banks
take risk and make money. It is simple. Our business is a kind of disguised
investment banking.
Mr. Kogure said:
Regarding its systems division, Japanese banks do not allow it to take risk when
developing systems. No errors are allowed People who do not make mistakes
because they do not take risks are evaluated much higher than those who try to
present a proactive proposal that may contain challenging uncertainty.
Mr. Otsubo added:
In my experience in Japan and the US., I usually am told "No" for new credit
applications or developing new products. People who are in the upper layers of the
bank 's hierarchy and have the power to authorize risk are not willing to take that
risk. As a result nothing is approved The U.S. is diferent. U.S. banks say "Yes" for
new business possibilities and then consider how to resolve the hurdles that stand in
the way of getting things done. These cross vectors of thinking undoubtedly cause
significant diferences in financial results.
4.4.5 Investment Policies for Systems
Lastly, I considered the system investment policies of three national banks. Banking is
part of the general service industry, and can be categorized as an information-intensive
industry. In general, people are aware of the visible aspects of banking such as retail,
corporate, and investment banking. Banks also demonstrate the kinds of deals they have
achieved and how much business they have brought in, which was discussed in Chapter 3.
What drove me to choose this thesis topic was the question about BTM's investment
policies for its systems. Few people, including BTM employees and customers, consider a
bank's systems because they are invisible. But in fact they are the core infrastructure, and
they can determine the success or failure of the banking business.
In BTM's case, its risk-averse attitude is reflected in the system investment policy that
has been adopted. There are two reasons why banks undertake such investment behavior:
strict banking regulations, and high customer demand for precise operations - neither of
which allow a bank to make any errors. Once a visible error occurs, banks will be harshly
judged by the public and regulators. Thus, avoiding even a single small error is a bank's first
priority when considering system investment. Mr. Kogure explained this point:
Most major U.S. banks stress system investment because they recognize the banking
business is a service industry. They constantly think about developing new systems
for cross selling financial products. They focus on customer demand for their
products. By contrast, Japanese banks focus on internal demand in the name of
customer demand Any error causes problems for customers. Therefore a banking
system should be error-free.
Mr. Otsubo, who now works at BTM's leasing subsidiary in the U.S., offered an
interesting opinion about the differences between Japanese and U.S. banks.
The features ofATMs in the U.S. are very simple compared with those in Japan. U.S.
banks do not care about individual customers' demands, and customers do not
expect the ATMs to offer complicated operating panels. US. banks sometimes make
mistakes, but customers do not sue for each tiny mistake. Probably no one expects a
high level of service from the bank Since basic system design is uncomplicated,
there are few major errors following a bank merger
On the other hand, Japanese banks incorporate customer demand as much as
possible. Therefore, ATMs offer a wide range offunctions to meet customer needs,
probably to avoid complaints from customers. Consequently the system design is
very complex, and each bank has a complicated banking system. Complex systems
are more likely to cause errors. Therefore, people have to take better care to keep
the systems running without error
When a bank merger happens, integrating the systems is very difficult. As they have
to avoid error, they focus on the internal system design.
The key issue is error avoidance. Since the investment budget is limited, most of the
budget goes to developing error-free system features. There is no budget for developing
innovative banking systems, only for system maintenance. In this sense, a bank does not need
a highly innovative and skillful workforce and in most cases employees in the systems
division receive less pay and are less qualified.
A business unit with less-qualified people is ranked among the lowest layers of the
organization structure. Banks cannot fire even these less-qualified people because of the
tradition of life-time employment, but it needs a business unit where such people have a job.
It is the system business unit that is ranked as the lowest level of business unit hierarchy. The
less-qualified people flow to the lesser-ranked business unit. As a result, by ranking the
business units, the bank maintains life-time employment.
4.5 Summary
Based on the interviews, the Japanese cultural aspects found in Japanese banks, fall
into five categories: collectivism, centralization, high power distance, risk-averse, and
long-term.
4.5.1 Collectivism
In view of the tight bonding in the typical work group organization structure, the
Japanese have a very collectivistic culture, with aspects of egalitarianism. Lifetime
employment is one phenomenon of collectivism, and personal evaluation systems encourage
the appearance of egalitarianism. Individual merit and goals are minimized in favor of
optimizing the bank's goals, and it is believed that such a strategy should ultimately produce
better payoffs for employees.
4.5.2 Centralization
The decision-making process is highly centralized, and even a general manager has
limited authority to make decisions. It takes time to make final decisions because even a
single application must go through several layers. The example of the personal evaluation
system illustrates just how centralized is the organization.
4.5.3 High Power distance
In conjunction with centralization, the relationships between people in Japanese banks
is based on a hierarchy that creates a "high power distance." In another words, the Japanese
prefer group acknowledgement rather than notice of personal achievement. It is expected that
subordinates will think and behave so their boss will not lose face rather than trying to
persuade their boss with logic.
4.5.4 Risk Averse
Every interviewee mentioned that Japanese banks are highly risk-averse. In conducting
its banking business, banks try to minimize risk, and the corporate climate places high value
on no risk-taking. Once one makes a mistake, he has little chance to recover. In general,
errors are not allowed.
The huge losses incurred by almost every Japanese bank were not the result of taking
risk, but a failure to hedge risk. Real estate prices in Japan rose continuously from the end of
war to the collapse of the bubble economy. There was a belief that Japanese real estate prices
would continue to rise, not decline. In fact, during the bubble economy, real estate prices
increased enormously. In this circumstance, the bank lent huge sums of money to companies
based on mortgage collaterals. Once the bank set a mortgage collateral for its credit, the
bank's credit was believed to be completely secured because the real estate price would go
up--or at least not go down. However, the collapse of the bubble economy caused the real
estate market to crash. Prices dropped on real estate that the banks had collateralized to cover
their credit risk. It generated tremendous amount of uncollateralized credit risk. In reality,
many companies became unable to pay back the bank loan and many companies went
bankrupt. As the result of using a single collateral, the banks suffered huge write-offs of
uncollectible debt.
4.5.5 Long-Term Perspective
Japanese banks are past and present-oriented. Most banks, including the main bank
system, emphasize history and tradition as a rich heritage with customers, even when
considering future business. They think of business over the long term, emphasize the
uncertainty of expected future business, and pursue only short -term benefit. The value of
long-term relationships leads the list of qualitative factors that are hard to measure but are
used for decision making. This is also apparent in the human resource development system.
There are still qualitative goals to be set as a yardstick for individual promotions.
Returning to my initial question-why Japanese banks have similar business and
geographical portfolios-it is the result of a set of national cultural factors like those
discussed in this chapter. Each factor interacts and reflects the bank's strategy and decision
making.
A risk-averse attitude plays an important role. Most banks do not attempt to go beyond
regulations in the search for new business. If an employee proposes an innovative idea, it is
usually denied on the basis of hedging risk. Even if someone agrees with an innovative idea,
the high power distance disturbs the process of considering it positively. As a result, the
business strategy of most banks moves in the same direction.
A geographically similar portfolio also results from these cultural issues. Japanese
banks do not like to be involved with risky, non-Japanese, corporate business because it is
hard to evaluate and hedge the risk. It is also a totally different business model from
corporate finance with Japanese firms. The main issue is how to maintain close relationships
with the bank's major customers and earn a profit from the relationship. In this sense,
although most major Japanese banks have physical overseas branches and subsidiaries, their
domestic business comprises the bulk of their business.
CHAPTER 5
A Study of German Banks
In this chapter I will describe the strategies and organizational characteristics of
German banks, many of which are similar to Japanese banks. I will also discuss similarities
and differences between German and Japanese banks. This analysis is based on interviews
with four German bank employees: two from Deutsche Bank and two from Bank of
Tokyo-Mitsubishi's (both of whom have work experience at the local German bank branch).
5.1 Organization
5.1.1 Structure
Figures 5-1 and 5-2 show the organizational structure of Deutsche Bank and Dresdner
Bank, respectively. Both banks divide the organization by division and function. At Deutsche
Bank, the board of managing directors controls the functions through functional committees
while simultaneously running the Group Executive Committees, which are responsible for
the divisions. At Dresdner Bank, committees like those at Deutsche Bank are not clearly
specified, but each division and function is headed and managed by a member of the board of
managing directors. Therefore, the basic structural concept is the same for both banks. In two
other German banks, HVB and Commerzbank, the structures are also similar.
When comparing the structure of German banks to Japanese banks (using BTM as an
example of a typical Japanese bank), BTM has a function called the "corporate center,"
which is clearly distinguished from the business units (divisions). In terms of the
organizational structure, there are few meaningful differences even though each bank comes
from a different national culture.
Figure 5-1
Deutsche Bank's management structure
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Figure 5-2
Dresdner Bank's organisational model
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5.1.2 Corporate Banking Unit
Corporate banking in German banks means all of the banking business associated with
a business or corporation, and therefore includes all aspects of commercial banking and
investment banking. Corporate relationship officers from the bank contact and talk with their
I
'
corporate customers, seeking to identify their specific needs. Then the officers pass these
needs to product specialists in the relevant bank division who makes a presentation to the
customer about how the bank can meet that need. The function of corporate officers is to
identify customer needs and connect them to the appropriate internal divisions. Figure 5-3
illustrates the typical duties of a corporate officer.
In Japanese banks, there are teams that handle the same kinds of functions. The most
obvious difference is that in Japanese banks, the division to which corporate officers belong
sits at the top of the hierarchy, which is not the case in German banks. There is no hierarchy
in German banks. Each job is different and independent. Corporate officers work as the
liaison between customers and the products divisions.
Figure 5-3
Mr. Hundt of Deutsche Bank, explains this point:
Corporate banking focuses on all aspects of the banking business related to
companies. It is so diverse that the corporate officer must analyze and determine
the detailed needs of the company's banking business. Then our specialists who
back up the corporate officer respond to the customer ' needs and help them
achieve a satisfactory banking business. It is teamwork and there is no hierarchy up
and down among business divisions. Each division hires people with excellent
qualifications. I work in the credit administration department in corporate banking
and I am a credit specialist. There is little rotation into a diferent area of the
business. It could happen that corporate officers would move from a small branch
to a larger branch and their clients would change from small companies to larger
companies. For the officer that means a better possibility for a promotion, but they
will keep working as a corporate officer and rarely move to another business
section.
5.1.3 System Services and Operation Services Business Units
As discussed above, there is no functional hierarchy, so the systems and services
business units are also independent and are not compared with the corporate banking units.
Mr. Bockenheimer of Deutsche Bank, told me:
The other divisions and departments do not look down on the systems and
operations divisions, nor is there discussion about which division is good and which
is not good Employees in the systems division are IT specialists. Their job content
and quality is totally diferent from employees in other divisions. Therefore
perjormance evaluation measures difer between the business divisions.
Mr. Henrychowski of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, added:
In the past some employees in German banks viewed the systems division and
operating services division as inferior to the front offices, which were directly
engaged in earning profits for the bank. Such a notion is different from the
hierarchy of business units in Japanese banks. Each division is independent. As far
as I know, German banks posted a board member as head of the IT division in the
early 1990s. Since then, the IT division is not regarded as inferior to the other
business divisions.
5.2 Human Resources
5.2.1 Human Resource Development System
Training
While Japanese banks utilize only internal training, German banks use both internal and
external training programs. German banks have an interesting education program-the "dual
system"-for training people. This means that in addition to training a new employee,
companies also accept several students and train them for a period of time (typically three to
six months). This system has advantages for both the companies and the students. For
students who would like to work at a financial institution after graduation, there are few
opportunities to obtain a basic banking job because they have no prior experience in the
banking environment. With the dual system, banks can assess the potential of each student
who has worked as a trainee and identify those who have the needed capabilities.
German banks also use external training programs. Prior to the 1990 reunification of
Germany, most German banks focused primarily on their domestic markets, and each bank
emphasized the dual system and their own internal training program. After reunification,
strategies changed, and the banking business expanded as it was necessary for German banks
to have employees with diverse knowledge who could compete with other banks. So each
business division strengthened its unique training program. Thus, unlike Japanese banks,
German banks do not rely solely on a centralized training system.
Hiring
The German hiring system is quite different from Japan but similar to the U.S. Each
German business unit hires people who have sufficient qualifications. In general, the typical
undergraduate student is relatively older, e.g., upper twenties or thirty, because German
universities are public and the tuition is free so students remain in university as long as
possible. There is no centralized human resources development system in Germany. Unlike
Japanese banks, the hiring policy of German banks is decentralized.
Life-time employment system
Unlike most Japanese banks that traditionally uphold a lifetime employment system,
the argument for lifetime employment in Germany is rarely heard, and it can be said that
there is no lifetime employment in Germany today. However, prior to the 1970s, Germany
had a similar system to Japan. Mr. Henrychowski (Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi) mentioned:
There was a kind of lifetime employment system in Germany until about 30 years
ago, and it was quite similar to the Japanese system. Like Japan, the German
economy continued to grow after the war, much like Japan. With a robust economy
and few younger laborers, the banks needed younger workers, so they handled
labor issues passively in order to keep the employees they had During this phase,
workers were not worried about layoffs, which soon led to the notion of lifetime
employment. However, during the 1970s and 1980s people who had an education
became the major workers and when recession came, they began moving to other
firms for better jobs. During this period, banks tried to acquire people with higher
qualifications from outside and they often fired unqualified people.
I recognize that today in Germany there may be layoffs. In case of Deutsche Bank, the
bank had 98,311 employees at the end of 2000, but that number was reduced to 65,417 by the
end of 2004. One-third of the bank's employees were laid off during the last four years
(Deutsche Bank Annual Review, 2000 and 2004). But there is no lifetime employment
system like there is in Japanese banks. From my perspective, the employees are
well-protected legally in Germany, more so than in Japan. In Germany, it is customary to
create an employment contract that has no expiration. If there are unavoidable reasons, then
the company can fire the employee, but in general layoffs in Germany are difficult.
Consequently, German employees tend to stay at one firm for a long time, and they do not
move even if they are offered better pay or promotions.
An interesting anecdote confirms this point. A manager in a major Japanese electronics
manufacturing company told me about his company's decision to move its office from
mid-Germany to a new location about 400 miles south. The company offered promotions and
better pay to key managers, hoping to persuade them to remain with the company and make
the move. But every German manager rejected the offer, instead choosing to stay in his/her
hometown and find a new job. Only two managers accepted the offer to move-and they
were British and French.
Mr. .Henrychowski (Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi) commented on this issue:
German labor laws give employees strong rights. But this has nothing to with
lifetime employment. When the Social Democratic Party ran the government, it
introduced a new social system that favored employees. They did so because
Germans had experienced difficult times following the war. A rigid and stable social
system was strongly desired by German workers who were just seeking individual
welfare and stability. Germany is traditionally a decentralized local culture. People
want to stay in their hometowns and enjoy local community life. They don't think of
their hometown and job location separately. They do not want to move. When
corporate issues conflict with their individual issues, Germans will choose their
individual interests first. Therefore Germans tend to stay at the same firm because it
fulfills their individual needs. For this reason, Germans tend to work at the same
company-like Japanese employees-but for very different reasons.
Mr. Hundt (Deutsche Bank) said:
There are a couple reasons why I would not change jobs. First, I can work in this
area and remain in my hometown, and second, the company is well-known for
offering excellent social security after retirement. I am not interested in moving to
another city over an hour away. I would not take it even if I were offered have a
promotion.
Mr. Bockenheimer (Deutsche Bank) added:
I work in the Frankfurt area and I am very happy with my job. I would never
consider leaving my city just to change assignments or my post.
In a similar example, a German officer working as an internal auditor at BTM in
Germany quit his job because he was going to be transferred to London due to the closure of
the German office. Moving to London represented an excellent opportunity for him: more
pay, more opportunities for advancement, and a better career. Yet he decided to go to a
German local bank that paid less salary. I asked him why. His answer was that he preferred to
stay in Germany with his family even though it was only a one-hour flight between London
and Germany and he would be home every weekend.
From the interviews I conducted, it is apparent that German thinking is quite rational
and family-and region-centered. Concerns about family have a higher priority over concerns
associated with an employee's job in the company. In this sense, autonomy is a typical
characteristic of German people.
5.2.2 Performance Evaluation System
Decentralization is reflected in the performance evaluation systems that are the
foundation of salary decisions. One's salary in Germany is comprised of two parts: basic
salary and a bonus. The basic salary is fixed, and regardless of the bank's performance, one's
salary rises based on the result of annual wage negotiations between the employees' union
and bank representatives. There is rarely a basic salary cut although the salary level could
remain at the same level for some employees. The bonus portion is depends on the
individual's performance. If the employee does not achieve certain target goals, he will
receive only the minimum bonus.
Mr. Hundt (Deutsche Bank) spoke about the evaluation system:
A person s bonus is entirely linked to his/her performance evaluation. We have a
rigid evaluation system that assesses targets and achievement. Individual results are
automatically calculated based on certain metrics and the bonus reflects this. There
is no room for assessment based on some qualitative factors. The final evaluation is
made by my direct supervisor On the other hand, my basic salary is fixed It is
automatically fixed during annual spring wage negotiations. I am satisfied with this
system. We have both a guaranteed salary and a performance-based bonus, which
we can optimize according to our own efforts.
Again, this comment reflects German autonomy because the evaluation system focuses
on each individual and his/her own efforts. In contrast, the Japanese evaluation system is
focused on each employee within an entire group.
5.3 Unions
Any discussion of unions in Germany must include the "Co-determination System
(Mitbestimung)," which is unique and plays an important role in corporate governance in
Germany. In the Co-determination System, corporate executives and representatives from the
bank's union make joint decisions regarding important corporate issues. This system has two
levels: each company's office level, and the overall corporate level.
Each branch organizes its own union to which workers belong. A workers' committee
(Betriebsrat) can negotiate with the management of the branch about relevant issues that
influence the union members-for example, working hours, changes in the organization, or
the training program. Branch management must negotiate those issues with the workers
committee, and management cannot make decision unilaterally.
At the corporate level, a corporate committee - say, the Auditing Committee-is
comprised of executives from the company and union members who are elected from the
entire company. The Auditing Committee has the right to make final decisions about
corporate issues that are decided by company board committees. In another words, union
members join the decision-making process for corporate issues. If the corporate executives
do not obtain agreement from the union members, the executives cannot execute a corporate
strategy.
Mr. Henrychowski (Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi) explained:
In Germany, the co-determination system and the worker committee are more
important than how the union is organized Corporate management has to consider
how to get along with them. This system was introduced intentionally by England
during its occupation of Germany. British people planned to introduce this system
in their country, but it did not work. Hence, they let Germany adopt this system
after the war in order to democratize former Nazi Germany. And it works, so we
still use it.
Mr. Bockenheimer (Deutsche Bank) added:
Deutsche Bank respects the Co-determination System and the CEO and other
executives base the bank's corporate strategy on this system. I think it is a good
system and it works well. Once corporate management achieves consensus from
everyone, including the workers committee, it is easy and comfortable for the CEO
to execute a series of strategies that align with the consensus.
Mr. Hundt (Deutsche Bank) said:
As far as I know, there have not been any strikes in the banking industry in Germany.
I am also a union member, and I am in total satisfied with Deutsche Bank strategy
because union members are well informed of the relevant corporate strategies.
Clearly, German unions, including banking unions, are deeply involved in the corporate
decision process. But in terms of salary negotiation, each union negotiates with corporate
representatives every year. The banking industry is categorized as a service industry, and the
union representatives negotiate for all service industries including the banking industry.
Does culture have some relevance to these phenomena? As I mention earlier, Germans
are independent and autonomous, but they tend to make decisions via consensus as these
examples illustrate. They view the relationship between management and employees over the
long term. In this sense, the German banking culture includes aspects of past and present
national culture.
5.4 Strategy
5.4.1 Target Customers
Prior to reunification, the target customers for German banks were German companies,
which was similar to current policies among Japanese banks. For example, Deutsche Bank
emphasized corporate and investment banking, similar to major U.S. banks. Today, Deutsche
Bank pursues not only German corporate customers but seeks its customers from among all
multinational companies. This does not imply that Deutsche Bank no longer seeks German
customers; rather, it has expanded its target customers based on changing strategies and a
policy that focuses more on global banking. Comments from Mr. Bockenheimer show how
Deutsche Bank has changed:
Before reunification, competition in the home market was less, and Deutsche Bank
achieved profits by pursuing German companies. However, a narrow focus only on
the German market is not enough for us to expand the business. Due to the Asian
financial crisis in the late 1990s and later the reunification of Germany, we
recognized that our current business strategy would limit further expansion. So we
changed the strategy drastically, i.e., moving away from a narrow focus on solely
German customers. The corporate banking unit was divided into two parts: large
multinational companies that have the potential for profitable fee business, and
small and medium-size companies that are domestic and can be handled the same
as private customers. We also acquired Spanish and Italian local banks in order to
obtain wider coverage in the European market.
Mr. Hundt (Deutsche Bank) commented:
The CIB unit targets fee business from large and multinational firms. We also
provide traditional commercial banking services, but it was clear that we needed to
change and expand our strategy from those of ten years ago.
Every interviewee noted that the late 1990s had a dramatic impact on the thinking of
German banks. They recognized that change was imperative in order to survive in the
increasingly fierce competition. And my interviews with bank officers confirmed that
German banks are changing. Deutsche Bank has expanded its business more globally and
tried to incorporate aspects of U.S. banking strategies. Dresdner Bank acquired an English
investment banking entity to strengthen its fee business. HVB has moved out of Germany
and now focuses on the Central and Eastern European market. In contrast, Commerzbank
focuses more on the domestic retail market in an effort to differentiate itself. As a result, it
recently merged with a domestic mortgage bank.
5.4.2 Customer Relations
The tendency of German people to maintain long-term relationships is also reflected in
the relationships between banks and their customers. In this sense German culture is similar
to Japanese culture. But the German definition of a long-term relationship is different from
Japan, and the German attitude is not as same as in Japan.
In my experience, I often faced hurdles when entering or expanding the banking
business with a German company. Even when we made a presentation of a new product and
the German company evaluated it, it was not easy for BTM to enter into a business
relationship regarding the new product because BTM had only a ten-year business
relationship with the company. German firms view their relationships with their banks in
much longer timeframes, and they respect past relationships.
A noticeable contrast between Japanese and German banks is that German bankers
think about things rationally. In a severe competition, German banks will consider reducing a
price to some degree, but when negotiations hit a certain threshold that is regulated by the
bank's internal rules, they will step back from further business, however strong the
relationship with the company might be.
Mr. Bockenheimer (Deutsche Bank) explained:
Take, for instance, customer relationships in pricing. The Customer Relations
manager can negotiate the price level internally based on total profit. The Risk
Committee plays an important role in checking risk and return. We have around
3,000 employees all over the world. Normally the Risk Committee defines an
adequate margin level, say "X", and the Customer Relations managers try to add
an "A" margin to "X" as much as possible. But when competition is strong, they
can negotiate the margin level with the Risk Committee. Since the committee is
totally independent from the front office and their decision is final and absolute,
once the committee decides the margin level, there is no chance to negotiate based
on customer relationships.
Mr. Krings of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi said:
German banks cherish their customer relationships and try to reflect flexibility with
the customers to maintain good relations. But they pay less attention to clients
whose historical relationship is not lengthy. I think German banks try to balance
their strategy between how to maximize profit in the short term and how to take
good care of long-term relationships.
5.4.3 Main bank system
In considering relationship policies, a comparison with the Japanese main bank system
is useful. There was a main bank system in Germany in the past, but such a system no longer
exists. Occasionally one might hear the phrase "House Bank," which refers to the old main
bank system, but today this phrase usually means the bank that has the largest banking
business share based on its anchor products, whose notions have changed from the previous
house bank.
Germany has a universal banking system that allows banks to run all kinds of financial
businesses, including banking, securities, and insurance. Since there is no regulation to limit
cross-share holding, most major German banks hold a large share of blue-chip companies.
For example, the proportion of shares of Siemens, Bayer, and Daimler-Benz held by three
major German banks in 1986 accounted for 32.5%, 61.7%, and 54.5%, respectively
(WSI-Mittteilung 5, 1986). Consequently, as shareholders, German banks had the power to
influence these companies, and in fact they did so. However, the situation changed in the late
1990s. Each German company's Form-20 filed to SEC in 2005 shows: in case of Siemens
there is no single person that has 5% or more of outstanding shares except for the current
chairman (Siemens Family); Bayer's top one shareholder is an institutional investor who has
4.94% of outstanding shares and Allianz Group (major German insurance company) reduced
the percentage of its share below 5%; Daimler-Benz's major share holder with over 5% of the
company's outstanding shares is a Kuwait investment company and Deutsche Bank has
reduced its holding to less than 5% of outstanding shares.
Mr. Bockenheimer (Deutsche Bank) explained:
There was a main bank system ten years ago, but we abolished it. In the 1990s we
dramatically changed our business strategy because of German reunification and
the Asian financial crisis. The collapse of the former Soviet bloc brought us a larger
market and we were obliged to move beyond Germany in order to grow our
business. We suffered huge losses due to the Asian crises, and we learned that
changing our strategy was essential. We restructured the organization and business
models in order to compete with other global banks. The rationale for measuring
figures was implemented, and this conflicted with the former cross-share holding
policy; therefore, we sold all shares we held as cross-holding. There were many
arguments and some German companies felt very strongly, but we achieved a new
strategy. The company shares we now hold are is based on pure investment.
This comment highlights the fact that Deutsche Bank is pursuing long-term relations in
order to make a profit. I can imagine how difficult it would be to negotiate with the
companies to sell their shares due to the cross-shareholding policy because I have been in a
similar situation in Japan. Cross-shareholding of stock is based on the assumption that the
bank and the company trust and support each other. The benefit to the company is to reduce
the risk of being taken over by a third party. The bank has more opportunities to expand its
banking business. Therefore, moving out of cross-shareholding means ending a trustful
relationship.
However, German banks have devoted considerable time to achieving the end result.
Along the way, they never ignored their long, close relationships with firms. But Deutsche
Bank did persuade its customers to retreat from cross-shareholding in order to survive. Also,
the bank believed this was the best way for the company to maintain close relationships with
its customers in the long run. This is a definitive difference between German banks and
Japanese banks. German banks recognized that they needed to change, and in the last ten
years, they have tried to make these needed changes.
5.4.4 Risk taking
It is often said that German people are quite conservative and do not like change. When
it comes to individuals and investing, their money is invested either in a savings account or a
mortgage (house or apartment) because these are less risky. Because of this conservative
approach, the capital market in Germany was small until 1990, and investing in corporate
equity was almost out of the question.
Corporations also tend to behave conservatively. They respect rules and try to get things
done by the rules. This is true of German banks as well. In this sense, German banks have a
risk-averse attitude, like Japanese banks, but the degree of risk aversion is different from
Japan. My assessment is that the level of risk tolerance among Germans lies somewhere
between highly risk-averse (Japan) and willing to take risks (U.S.).
Mr. Bockenheimer (Deutsche Bank) explained:
In reference to the German mentality, we are careful when doing business. Even if
there is something new we do not take it immediately. If we see a chance to earn
profit by selling something, we may not sell it simply to take short-term profits.
Perhaps the hard times we have faced following two defeats in war and the
experience of hyper-inflation after the WWI is instilled in German people 's minds.
However, once we decide to do something risky, we will continue until reaching our
initial target. In general, we take less risk. But that does not mean that we do not
take risk. It takes a certain amount of time for us to make a decision to take risk.
Going back to the strategies of the four major German banks, each bank appears to
pursue their strategy in a different way. But it also proves that each is taking risks. From this
point of view, even if German banks are risk-averse, they are less risk-averse than Japanese
banks, but more risk-averse than U.S. banks.
5.4.5 Investment Policies for Systems
This risk-averse attitude is also reflected in investment policies for IT systems in
German banks. Mr. Bockenheimer told me that the amount of IT investment is not as large as
that of U.S. banks; instead the main target is maintaining the current system. Yet, unlike
Japanese banks, this is not because of error avoidance. The IT division is dependent on the
front office for its investment budget allocation, which is based on the requirements of the
front office. This is a phenomenon of decentralization.
Because German banks emphasize their relationships with major customers, if
necessary, they will invest in developing specific features that will enable the bank to meet an
important customer's requirements. But they do not tend to invest in innovative ideas in
reference to potential customer needs for banking systems.
Mr. Krings (Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi) explained:
Some large customers have a need to configure their system to the bank system in
order to rationalize their work procedure. German banks respond quickly and
develop or modify their own banking system to meet the customer 's requirement.
BTM puts much less priority on such requirements, especially considering the risk
of error
In terms of the willingness to invest resources in a system, there is a slight
diference between German banks and Japanese banks, based on how they view
customers. From my perspective of being able to compare both banks, German
banks take more note of their customers needs for IT investment in systems than do
Japanese banks. But regarding innovative investment, German banks do much less
than US. banks.
Mr. Asano (Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi) gave his opinion about the German bank
system:
I think individual customer demand for a bank system like ATMs is not so high in
Germany as it is among Japanese customers. ATMs in Germany do not have as
many functions as in Japan. While an ATM on- line system is taken for granted in
Japan, ATMs in Germany are still off-line. Ifound it inconvenient when I came here.
But people in Germany do not think so. The German ATM system seems to fulfill
minimum requirements.
The IT investment policies of German banks seem to be more risk-tolerant than Japan
but much less daring than the U.S.
5.5 Summary
5.5.1 Individualism
According to Parsons and Shils (1951), individualism is defined as an orientation
primarily toward the self, while collectivism means an orientation primarily toward common
goals and objectives. In this sense, Germany has an autonomous and independent culture
compared to Japan. As the interviewees indicated, most German people value their individual
interests rather than the goals of a group. But it is interesting to note that German people tend
to prefer consensus, which is normally recognized as typical of collectivism. As I will discuss
in the next chapter, however, individualism in the German culture is weaker that in the U.S.
5.5.2 Decentralization
Compared with Japanese banks, the decision-making process at German banks is quite
decentralized. Each business division has the autonomy to make decisions regarding its own
business issues. They also have the right to hire necessary personnel. Performance
evaluations are based on visible and clearly defined rules for each organizational layer. This
contrasts sharply with Japanese organizations.
5.5.3 Power Distance
The hierarchical structure is less in German banks than in Japanese banks, but the
structure in each business unit is rigid. The proportion of supervisory personnel in German
banks is less than in Japanese banks, and the decision-making process is decentralized. The
power of distance in Germany is not as strong as in Japan.
5.5.4 Risk Tolerance
Most Germans tend to avoid risk; at the very least, they do not take risk proactively. In
this sense, risk aversion is a cultural phenomenon. However, once German banks identify a
problem and recognize that it is necessary to take a risk in order to resolve the problem, they
will take the risk and challenge the problem. Thus, it can be said that Germans are not willing
take risk, but compared to the Japanese, they are less risk-averse.
5.5.5 Long-Term Perspective
German banks are past and present-oriented. Although the main bank system has
disappeared (unlike Japan), German banks still emphasize history and past relationships with
customers and they consider such factors when making decision. But there is a threshold
beyond which German banks will not go when relying on relationships. The threshold seems
to be more rigorous than Japanese banks.
It has been said that Germans have some cultural similarities to the Japanese, and
during my eight-year stay in Germany I sometimes saw those similarities. But other times I
found them substantially different from the Japanese. Mr. Henrychowski (Bank of
Tokyo-Mitsubishi) told me he agreed that there were some similarities of German culture
with Japanese culture in terms of emphasizing consensus in society. Mr. Bockenheimer
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(Deutsche Bank) explained that German people were very careful, and quite different from
U.S. people. If I focus only on these points, I can say that there are many cultural similarities
with the Japanese culture.
However, there are many differences that I also felt were valid. Germans are
individualists and prefer decentralization. In response to my question about what "German"
is, Mr. Henrychowski (Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi) answered "independence."
I found that German banks have tried to change themselves and/or their strategies. In
the words of Mr. Henrychowski, Germans have given up things they liked in the past. Mr.
Bockenheimer (Deutsche Bank) said that German banks are choosing to escape from the
narrower German community and step into globalization.
It seems to me that the key issue must be the extent of risk tolerance. Germans are now
taking risk, which is sustained by German cultural characteristics such as individualism and
decentralization. I think this issue distinguishes Germans from Japanese. German cultural
values are changing, while Japanese cultural values remain same.
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CHAPTER 6
A Study of U.S. Banks
In this chapter I will discuss the organizational and strategic distinctions of U.S. banks
as compared with Japanese and German banks. I will discuss similarities and differences
2between U.S. banks and their German and Japanese counterparts.
6.1 Organization
6.1.1 Structure
Figure 6-1 depicts the corporate structure of Citigroup, which has four major business
groups. Each business unit has its own CEO who is responsible for his business area, and all
are members of the Citigroup Management Committee. The CEO and COO of Citigroup
(also members of the Citigroup Management Committee) have ultimate responsibility.
Each bank's management structure appears superficially the same. Like Citigroup,
Bank of America has a similar management structure. JP Morgan Chase does not have a CEO
for each business group, but the business groups are clearly divided and controlled by the
board directors. German banks and Japanese banks are the same.
2 Information for this chapter comes from interviews with four American bank officers, two of whom work at Bank of
Tokyo-Mitsubishi in New York City, one with East Cambridge Savings Bank (Cambridge, Massachusetts); and the other
with UBS (New York). Because I had no opportunity to contact the three major U.S. banks cited in Chapter Three, I could
not interview bank officers from those banks. However, the interviews I conducted were with Americans who have current
experience in U.S. banks, so I believe my interview results represent typical characteristics of U.S. banks.
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Figure 6-1
Citigroup management structure
CEOCitigroup* Presidend & COO,Citigroup*#
Chairman & CEO*# H Global Consumer Group
Chairman & CEO*# Global Wealth Management
President & CEO*# - Corporate and Investment Banking
Chairman & CEO*# - Global Investment Management
*Member of Citigroup Management Committee
# Member of Citigroup/Citi Bank N.A. Board of Directors
Source: Citigroup Inc. (2005) 2004 Annual Report
Could one therefore conclude that there are no differences in the organizational
structure of these three banks? Superficially, perhaps no. But from the perspective of
decision-making procedures, one would have to say yes. Look again at Citigroup's
management structure (see Figure 6-1), and it is clear that the business group CEO stands out.
The empowerment of each business group CEO seems relatively high after he/she makes
decisions, which implies strong decentralization.
Figure 6-2 shows the organization of Deutsche Bank. In this structure, there is a Group
Executive Committee because of the co-determination system in Germany. Unlike Citigroup,
the Deutsche Bank CEO cannot make decisions by himself, but they must be done in
committee with the consensus of all board members. Only then is the business group
empowered to execute according to the instructions given. While this is another form of
decentralization, its nature is different from Citigroup.
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Figure 6-2
Deutsche Bank's management structure
Functional Committees
8 functons (copliance, HR, IT etc.)
Group Executive Committee
Group Board
Heads of Business/Regions
Divisional Committees
Corp(
Inves
bank
Source: Deutsche Bank AG (2005) Annual Review 2004
Figure 6-3 illustrates the organization structure for BTM. Here, the empowerment of
each business unit is not obvious, nor is the authority of the CEO clearly specified. There is
no hint of the decision-making process, and nothing indicates the emphasis on the traditional
consensus-driven culture.
Figure 6-3
Corporate organization of the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsusbishi., Ltd.
Board of Directors
Executive
-
Retail banking
Commercial banking
Global corporate banking I
Investment banking and
asset management
Operation services
System services
Source: Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, Inc. (2005) Annual Report 2004
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Mr. Jeffers, who works at BTM New York, and has had considerable work experience
in American banks said:
Citigroup ' business function is totally independent and corporate relation managers
coordinate relations among business lines as liaison. Each business group is like an
independent bank. Therefore, the head of the business group is titled as CEO and if
business goes down it usually happens that CEO of a business group is replaced I
have been working at BTM for 25 years, and I know many bank officers at other
American banks. The business groups at American banks have much higher
independence than Japanese banks.
Mr. Leffler who joined BTM in May 2005 and worked previously at Dresdner Bank
New York, explained:
German banks are independent, but US. banks are even more independent.
Deutsche Bank now looks like a typical US. bank. Dresdner is aiming to introduce
the U.S. banking business model. However, the acquisition of Kleinwort
Wasserstein failedfrom my perspective.
Mr. Gershkowitz, who works at UBS in New York and worked previously at Citibank
said:
In terms of dividing business divisions, there is no diference between Citibank and
Deutsche Bank. But Deutsche Bank has a dual board member system based on
co-determination, which Citibank does not have. In the dual board member system,
corporate decisions are made by consensus, while in Citibank the CEO makes every
key decision alone and gives each business unit CEO power of execution. After
empowerment, each business CEO can decide the business issue in each business silo,
which is a major diferentiator from other banks.
My interview results strongly suggest the independence of U.S. bank business units as
part of an overall policy of decentralization.
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6.1.2 Corporate Banking Units
According to Mr. Jeffers (BTM-NY), corporate banking in the U.S. is a combination of
commercial banking and investment banking, which is much broader than what Japanese
banks intend.
Mr. Jeffers added:
The relationship between corporate banking and investment banking is like the
relation between both sides of a coin. Banks classed as investment banks are
consistent with banks that are highly ranked in the CMS [Cash Management System]
area. Both banks and companies do not distinguish equity business from the clearing
transactions business. It is rare that a company uses a bank only for investment
banking business and uses another for transactions business. Therefore we have to
provide a wide range of financial products, otherwise we would have few
opportunities to handle the banking needs of US. companies.
The notion of corporate banking is same as German bank. Since each business group is
independent, there is no hierarchical gap between business groups. In this sense, US banks
are close to German banks, but they are far different from Japanese banks.
6.1.3 System Services and Operations Services Business Units
There seems to be far less hierarchy among business units, and the IT and Operations
business units are independent. According to Mr. Jeffers (BTM-NY):
Many years ago, the position of the IT division was lower than the front office.
Nowadays every US. bank emphasizes IT investment and hires highly qualified IT
specialists. Therefore, the IT business unit is now at the same level as other
business unit. Many people now work in the IT division, and they earn more money
than people in the corporate and investment banking groups.
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Mr. Gershkowitz (UBS) stated:
At UBS, the IT division is totally independent from other divisions. It never happens
that employees working in a business division are transferred to the IT division
because of their performance evaluation. Their performance is evaluated based on
a rigorous evaluation system that reflects pay. That 's it.
Neither U.S. banks nor German banks position their IT divisions as do Japanese banks.
In U.S. and German banks, the IT division is completely independent within the organization
structure.
6.2 Human Resources
6.2.1 Human Resources Development System
Responsibility for human resources is decentralized within each business group. Since
the key issue is independence, each business group hires and develops their people according
to their own rules. U.S. banks have less training relations as is legally required in Germany,
nor do they have an internal training system like that developed in Japan. Each U.S. bank's
unique training system is more systematic with the legal requirement.
Mr. Jeffers noted:
Thirty years ago, US. banks had internal training programs and trained their own
employees themselves. But now there is no internal training program in the major US
banks. Instead, they use external programs. The reason is simple. It is rational, and
banks can minimize cost and internal workload There are specialists outside the
banks who maintain specialized and current knowledge about banking issues. It is
useful for us to leverage such training programs.
Ms. Lapierre, who works at East Cambridge Savings Bank, added:
Our Human Resource department is responsible for bank-wide training programs
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and br initial orientation of all staff because our business scope is focused on private
consumer banking in our hometown area. Department-specific training is conducted
within each department. Industry education is strongly recommended and valued
Outside specialists are occasionally brought in to conduct training sessions such as
sales training, leadership, and other subject matter as necessary.
Mr. Gershkowitz (UBS) said:
UBS uses an external training program, but it uses more internal programs. I think
the situation is the same for most US. banks. There are various training programs,
depending on the job and individual talent. Due bank mergers, the number of banks
has dropped So it squeezes the number of leadership seminars and it becomes a
competitive advantage.
Training programs at U.S. banks differ among the business divisions and depending on
employee talent. They are also used to encourage people to compete internally. The key idea
is individualism. Unlike Japanese banks, they do not think of skill training for the newest
group of employees hired in the same year.
Employment System
There are major differences in the employment systems of Japanese, German, and U.S.
banks. Japanese banks generally maintain a lifetime employment system. German banks do
not, but German employment rights are strongly protected by contract, and most Germans
tend to remain at the same company throughout their careers.
In contrast, there is neither lifetime employment nor do Americans tend to stay at one
company for a long time. Moving from one company or bank to another is often done if the
goal is to obtain higher salary and better promotions. Americans do not hesitate to move from
one location to another.
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Mr. Gershkowitz (UBS) said:
There is no lifetime employment in the US. I suppose among the developed countries
only Japan uses such a system. Usually there is no contract between US. companies
and their employees. Those who do sign contracts are usually higher-level executives.
You can fire a subordinate not only because of performance but also because you
don't like his behavior, and you don't have to disclose the reasons when you give two
weeks' notice. However, you cannot fire people for reasons of gender or handicap
because you will have big troubles such as lawsuits. Otherwise, people do not sue
just because they are fired
Mr. Leffler (BTM) said:
The corporate culture of US. banks is short-term; they change quickly and fire people
often due to change. It is common that employees will change banks several times. I
came to BTM from Dresdner Bank because I saw more opportunities here than in the
previous bank I worked both in the US. and in a couple cities in Europe. I have never
worked in Asian countries including Japan, but if I had the opportunity to work in
Japan, I would be happy to go. Comparing German people with Americans, German
people try to balance the workload with their personal life. For example, Americans
will come to the office on the weekend if they have work to get done, but Germans
would not do that.
This comment illustrates the different perspectives on individualism between U.S. and
German employees. The U.S. has an individualistic culture. U.S. people focus on higher pay,
rapid promotions, and visible status more than Germans.
Referring to the case of the German auditor cited in Chapter four, if he were a Japanese
employee he would go to London because it was for the benefit of the group; if he were an
American employee, he would, off course, go to London because it was meant higher pay
and promotions.
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6.2.2 Performance Evaluation System
The evaluation system in U.S. banks is performance-oriented. It maintains a short-term
perspective (that is, future-oriented). It is individualistic and decentralized. Individual
evaluations are linked to the company's goal set at the beginning of the fiscal year. Bonuses
are tied to individual achievement. Appraisals are conducted and completed by supervisors.
These characteristics are different in Japanese and German banks. Perhaps the most
noticeable is the volatility of the bonus due to performance. Although there are big
differences in salary range, there is little difference in terms of changes in monthly salary
among the three national banks. In Japan and Germany, basic salary is determined by the
annual spring wage negotiations. In the U.S. there are no such negotiations. The basic salary
is established at the beginning of employment and remains almost unchanged at a minimum
figure. The more critical portion of a U.S. bank employee's pay is the bonus. The
proportionate weight of the bonus is so high that an employee either leaves the bank because
of dissatisfaction with his bonus, or has to leave due to a poor evaluation resulting from
underperformance.
Mr. Gershkowitz (UBS) explained:
US banks have a rigid performance evaluation system. An employee's salary is
comprised of basic salary and bonus. Bonus is completely dependent on the
individual ' performance evaluation. It is very much a performance-oriented system,
which reinforces individual competition in the bank. Bonuses are not given very often,
but basic salary is not reduced Theoretically you can reduce the basic salary, but
giving less bonus is a signal to the employee of underperformance and such people
should leave the bank
Mr. Jeffers (BTM-NY) said:
We set goals every six months and a corporate bank officer ' performance in relation
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to the goals decides his salary for the next six months. Bonus is linked to the degree
of achievement. In the major US. banks, bonus is much higher than at BTM If you
achieve 300% against the goals, you would have a minimum three times multiple
amount based on the agreed basis bonus. At BTM we do not have such a high amount
even if we could achieve 300%. On the other hand, BTM does not reduce any bonus
drastically ifsomeone does not achieve his/her goals. Performance evaluation in U.S.
banks is more volatile than in Japanese banks. I am personally satisfied with the
Japanese system.
Ms. Lapierre (ECSB) advocates the same notion in a regional bank:
Annual performance appraisals are conducted for everyone-staff and management.
This performance is tied to bank goals, and if a bonus is approved, the appraisal
determines what percentage of the bonus pool the individual is entitled to receive.
Bonuses are paid if the bank meets its annual goals in specific categories, and if it
performs equal to or better than its peers.
While Japanese banks try to evaluate their employees' performance equally and
minimize the differences among people in order to maintain lifetime employment, U.S. banks
evaluate performance differently and dramatically to encourage individual competition.
German banks fall somewhere between the practices of Japanese banks and the practices of
U.S. banks.
6.3 Unions
Another significantly different phenomenon is unions. Japanese banks and German
banks have unions-different systems in each nation's bank-but the unions play an
important role in determining the issues associated with bank strategies. However, U.S.
banks do not have unions. Mr. Jeffers (BTM-NY) said that there were no union issues in the
U.S. as there are in Japan and Germany. In response to my question as to why U.S. banks did
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not have unions, Mr. Gershkowitz (UBS) answered in a fashion that may be typical of the
way bankers in the U.S. think and talk about this issue:
The reason is very simple. The average salary in the banking industry is much higher
than other industries. Even lower-level employees enjoy a higher salary that other
industry workers. There is no advantage for bankers to organize in a union.
Historically, industries that have unions are those with a rigorous labor environment
and low wages.
Mr. Leffier (BTM) stated:
I think the reason why we do not have a union is a phenomenon of US. culture. We
don't want to perform and act together; we prefer to negotiate and act individually I
do not see any advantage for us in having a union. Unions have more disadvantages
than advantages for individual workers and companies. The word "union" sounds
negative, like coming from communism. That is probably one reason why we do not
like unions.
For me, this comment was amazing! In my experience I have always been involved in
union issues, both in Japan and Germany. The existence of a union in Germany is so much
taken for granted that I have deliberated on the management side about how we could
optimize the merits of the bank with respect to the union's interest.
The existence of unions for the banking industry is an indicator of the degree of
individualism and collectivism. An individualistic culture values the individual purpose,
while a collectivistic culture emphasizes the group purpose. In the U.S., as individualism is
highly valued, people do not form a group or association if it is perceived to hinder
individual freedom and rights. In the U.S. banking industry, bankers see few advantages for
themselves to have unions. There is far less reason for American bankers to organize into
unions.
In contrast, Japan has a collective culture where individual purpose is less valued.
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People assume that since the union is expected to represent all employees, it "always"
performs in favor of employees, In fact, it does perform to some degree. But, in reality, in the
Japanese banking industry, union power is very weak. The important thing is that the bank
has a union. A union gives meaning to its existence. People are comfortable that they belong
to a group. If there were no union, there would be no group to which employee might belong.
Even if the union is a facade, it has a meaning.
In Germany, unions substantially represent the employees' interest. Compromise
between company management and the unions is much less than in Japan. German unions are
not a facade, but is there no option not to form a union. In this sense, the style of German
unions seems to be a mixture of Japanese collectivism and American individualism.
6.4 Strategy
6.4.1 Target Customers
As pointed out in Chapter Four, the target customer range gives some implication of the
bank's cultural background. Japanese banks mainly target Japanese firms. German banks
changed their original policy of targeting German companies and are now trying to broaden
their target beyond the domestic market.
What about U.S. banks? With regard to corporate banking, major U.S. banks target all
corporate customers, both domestic and foreign, by deploying overseas offices, and they do
not draw any boundaries based on nationality. In the retail banking area, the three major
banks have different strategies. Citibank's target is individual customers worldwide. JP
Morgan Chase targets individual customers in certain areas outside the US. Bank of America
targets mainly U.S. private accounts.
It is interesting to note that although the three major U.S. banks' corporate banking ratio
113
differs, each bank aims at multinational companies and not just U.S. companies. In particular,
Citibank's worldwide network is incomparable to other banks. When I was working as
corporate relationship manager, I competed with Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, and Deutsche
Bank in the investment banking business. When I was in private banking for one of the large
Japanese companies, my bank faced stiff competition from a Citibank proposal right in our
home market.
Regarding targeted customers, Mr. Jeffers (BTM-NY) said:
US banks target all kinds of corporate customers all over the world In order to
acquire business in local markets, they construct an entity in each country and hire
local employees. Indeed, other global banks are now doing business the same way as
does Citibank, but the scale of organization and business is totally different. Also
Citibank has brand recognition, which gives it more chance to hire highly qualified
people in each country. It is a virtuous circle.
Citibank's history, as described in its 2004 Annual Report shows how the bank has
expanded its global network since its inception. The history of Citibank is a history of
expansion and diversification of its business all over the world. Perhaps one reason is a sense
of risk taking. U.S. banks are more willing to take risks in order to enhance their business.
Risk-taking is sustained by individualism, decentralization, and a short-term perspective - all
typical characteristics of U.S. banks.
6.4.2 Customer Relations
U.S. bank officers perceive customer relations much differently from Japanese and
German bank officers. While the Japanese and German attitude of customer relations implies
long-term and a past/present-oriented perspective, American attitudes tend to favor a
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short-term and future-oriented perspective. Japanese and German officers make business
decisions by emphasizing their past and present relationships with customer. This is
especially true for Japanese bank officers. Therefore, they often make decisions based on
qualitative circumstances, which does not appear to be as logical for Germans and U.S. bank
officers. Germans also value past/present-oriented banking relationships, but German bank
officers define a much clearer line between emphasizing the past/present and future relations.
Mr. Jeffers (BTM-NY) explained:
US banks emphasize relationships with customers, but as the Japanese do it, it is
impossible for US. banks to make business decisions based only on a historical
relationship with a company. The relationship belongs to the individual person, for
example, the CEO of a bank knows the CEO of a company, or the bank relationship
manager knows their counterparts. Business moves at diferent levels. If we find a
new company with which we could have profitable business, we move fast to establish
a relationship with that company. It is that simple.
Mr. Gershkowitz (UBS) said:
In my experience, U.S. banks are very aggressive and short-sighted toward customers,
while European banks are passive and gentle. U.S. banks tend to make presentations
to customers and push customers to make deals. In the case of the merger between
BellSouth and AT&T, UBS stepped away from this deal because it has a longstanding
relationship with Vodafone. In contrast, major US. banks entered the deal even
though they had business relationships with both AT&T and Vodafone. This is
indicative of the idea that European companies think that once a relationship is
formed, it lasts forever However, I think that is not always right anymore. A big Swiss
chemical company with which UBS has a long-term relationship entered into an
M&A deal, and it did so with other banks without letting UBS know. That caused a
panic. I suppose relations between German banks and their customers are in the
same situation.
My experience in a German bank (noted in Chapter 5) contrasts with Mr. Jeffers'
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comment. I had no opportunity to put together a deal with a German company although we
had a ten-year relationship with them.
In Japanese banks this is often the case. It is not easy for a company that does not have
a credit business relationship with a Japanese bank because Japanese banks emphasize the
company's business history and the relation with the bank. Typically, the company opens an
account with a bank, waits for a year, then it can begin talking about establishing a credit
business. However, Japanese banks more readily establish business ties with a new company
that belongs to a well-known Japanese conglomerate (Keiretsu) or one that is founded by
someone who worked at a larger company with which the bank has a relationship.
Main Bank System
There is no main bank system in the U.S., which Japanese banks have, and German
banks had in the past. Such a system symbolized the lengthy business relations.
Mr. Jeffers (BTM-NY) said:
In the U.S. we don't have a main bank system like in Japan. Usually US. companies
categorize the banks with which they have a relationship into tier one and tier two,
and they use the banks for diferent purposes. Each bank has a specific role that the
company is expecting. Tier one banks are those that the company perceives as having
higher-quality services and products. Selection is based on the quality of financial
products and services provided by the banks. If quality goes down, the bank drops
from tier one to tier two. Each bank competes against the others in obtain more
business or to get into the higher tier by making deals. Even a new bank could have
an appointment with the person in charge of banking in the treasury department of a
company and have an opportunity to make a presentation. If the presentation
convinces the company to use the new bank, it is good for both the company and the
bank because both will benefit.
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This comment illustrates the thinking in U.S. banks-short-term and future- oriented.
Mr. Leffler (BTM) added that the most valued thing is achievement in a specified period,
such as three months and at longest six months. The reason why he came to BTM from
Dresdner Bank was because he saw little potential for earning a profit in the next six months.
U.S. companies have a similar philosophy. Making a profit or benefit by dealing with current
products to generate visible profit is much more highly valued than the invisible potential in
a long-term relationship.
6.4.3 Risk taking
U.S. banks have a proactive attitude for risk taking. Mr. Otsubo of BTM Capital
recalled from his work experience in the U.S. that most Americans think of risk and its
associated issues from a positive perspective, while the Japanese think about it from a
negative view. U.S. banks simply assume that taking some risk is necessary in order to make
money and maximize profit. Of course, there are some risks that U.S. banks will not take, but
in general they tend to think about how to tolerate the risk. By contrast, Japanese banks are
so risk-averse that their starting point is how to hedge the risk, and they tend to take on as
little risk as possible. Germans fall somewhere in between, but their attitudes toward
risk-taking are changing, moving away from risk-aversion.
Mr. Leffler (BTM) disclosed his opinion about the banks of the three nations:
The Japanese try to reach consensus because there are rules, they are absolute, and
they have to protect the absolute. Once a credit office says no, it is natural to reach
consensus explaining why it is negative.
In German banks, even if the credit office answers negatively, discussion ensues
through which afinal consensus is reached
In U.S. banks, even if the credit office denies an application based on the rules,
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front-office people consider the rules and the situation and try to get things done. US.
bank officers believe they cannot do business when they must always obey the rules.
Mr. Gershkowitz (UBS) explained:
I think the propensity of US. banks to take risk is relatively high. But when they
take risk, they hedge the risk with every kind offinancial engineering means, and as
a result, they make it risk free. They try to create risk-hedging methods.
The perception of risk in the U.S. is totally different. If something has a possibility of
enhancing business, U.S. businessmen will think about how to do it. There is always risk; it
is almost impossible to entirely eliminate risk. When a project has a 60% possibility of
success and a 40% risk of failure, Japanese banks see it as too risky because they might fail
with a 40% possibility. The end result is oftentimes doing nothing. But U.S. banks see that
there is a 60% possibility of success, so they try to determine every way to hedge the risk. To
take risks, they create hedging methods that hopefully will eliminate the risk. The difference
of willingness to take risk between U.S. and Japanese banks is enormous.
This attitude sometimes creates a problem when conducting business in another culture.
Since 2002, the Financial Services Agency (FSA) in Japan discloses all administrative
measures imposed on credit institutions in Japan. Thus, the FSA controls every financial
institution that performs financial business in Japan. It monitors each financial institution's
behavior, and if any problem arises that violates the rules, the FSA takes appropriate
administrative measures, which vary according to the nature of the violation. According to
current statistics published in January 2006 (FSA, 2006), the total number of administrative
measures is 457, and most of them are business improvement orders resulting from a lack of
control over following internal operating procedures, inappropriate and/or insufficient
achievement of financial goals reported to the authority. These represent the lightest
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penalties.
Some credit institutions received severe penalties from the FSA, including an order to
suspend business in Japan. Among these are Citibank, Cititrust Bank, Standard Chartered
Bank, Banco de Brazil, and Deutsche Trust Bank. No Japanese or Asian banks have received
such severe penalties in the last four years. The Citibank case was so sensational that most of
the Japanese media reported the case, which included business behavior that violated the
Japanese bank act.
Why were those four foreign banks (including two that I discuss in this thesis) the only
ones to receive such severe penalties? Perhaps it is related to the attitude of risk- taking
compounded by a climate that emphasizes individual performance. Although people in
Citibank know about the strict compliance rules, they went over line. It is my feeling that the
risk-taking attitude pushed them over the edge.
I need to investigate more precisely before concluding that there is a correlation with
the U.S. cultural attitude of risk-taking, but I mention it as an interesting and possible issue
for future consideration.
6.4.4 Policies for Systems Investment
U.S. bank policies for investment in systems also reflects the general willingness to
take risks. U.S. banks opt to maintain and develop a banking system based on future
customer needs. In contrast, Japanese and German banks maintain their systems to meet
current customer needs. The IT budgets for major U.S. banks is far larger than those of
Japanese and German banks. For instance, Citibank registered $3,566 million for technology
and communication expenses in its 2004 consolidated income statement. Deutsche Bank
spent $2,105 million (E1,726 million) for IT expenditures in 2004. BTM spent an estimated
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$1,450 million in 2004, although BTM does not disclose a breakdown of IT expenditures.
The amount of expenditure illustrates each bank's willingness to invest in the IT area to
support banking business.
The willingness of U.S. banks to invest in IT is shown in the IT investment policy of
Morgan Stanley in Tokyo. Mr. Suzuki's comments in Chapter Three support this point.
Morgan Stanley invested enough resources into developing its banking system to acquire
Japanese blue-chip companies, even though Morgan Stanley's market position in Japan is
quite low. It required a willingness to take risk and invest in the IT area. In contrast, BTM's
investments in oversea markets have been passive. BTM invests in IT only when it becomes
unavoidable.
German banks have the same tendency, but considering Deutsche Bank's IT
expenditure, at least Deutsche Bank is trying to strengthen its IT investment.
Mr. Gershkowitz (UBS) explained:
In the banking industry, IT investment is a powerful generator In particular,
investment banking leads IT investment because their business is linked to IT
technologies. In order to fulfill compliance requirements, IT investment is especially
important. Expenditures for IT are a key driver and necessary essential cost for
enhancing business and doing cross-selling. As Deutsche Bank is similar to US.
banks, it has the same ITpolicy. In contrast, Dresdner Bank emphasizes M&A deals,
such as acquiring Kleinwortwassestein, so it does not need as much IT investment as
Deutsche Bank because M&A deals do not require IT technologies, the IT investment
policies of US. banks rests on selling tools that will reduce the number of personnel.
German banks have some constraints to do as the US. banks because of the German
co-determination system. If German banks utilized IT investment as a way to reduce
the workforce, the workers committee would not accept it.
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Mr. Jeffers ((BTM-NY) cited an interesting example about "BlackBerry":
As you know, the "BlackBerry" has become wildly popular in the US, with many
businessmen using this device daily. For the corporate relationship officer at a US.
bank, a BlackBerry is a necessary tool, like a cellphone. Every US. bank around New
York provides a BlackBerry to its officers to facilitate communication with customers
and to respond to their needs as quickly as possible. Our customers communicate
with us on the assumption that we are using the device just like other US. banks. But,
in reality, since we do not use BlackBerry, we cannot read customers 'e-mail until we
return to the office and browse our e-mail site. This causes time loss. We cannot
respond to customer inquiries and questions as quickly as our competitors. We have
asked to be provided with a BlackBerry, but BTM does not allow bank officers to use
such a communication tool. I suppose the reasons are system integration and
additional system investment cost. I think the technical issues and risks BTM
considers could be solved The biggest reason is unwillingness to take risk and invest
money in this new IT area.
6.5 Summary
6.5.1 Individualism
As the employment and evaluation systems show, U.S. banks promote a culture of
individualism. The absence of any banking union is the strongest evidence distinguishing the
U.S. bank culture from that in Germany and Japan. There is little evidence to describe a
primary orientation toward common goals and objectives for U.S. banks. Both U.S. and
German banks are categorized as individualistic, but individualism seems stronger in the U.S.
than in Germany because the German people still strive to reach consensus.
6.5.2 Decentralization
U.S. banks are decentralized, as are German banks. A decision is made in each business
unit and performance evaluation is handled between superiors and subordinates. Citibank and
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JP Morgan Chase deploy their subsidiaries all over the world, and each subsidiary has the
authority to make decisions regarding the local business. The head of the local subsidiary has
full responsibility. This is totally the opposite of Japanese banks
6.5.3 Low Power Distance
The attitude of U.S. banks is to try to get things done even if strict rules means lower
power distance. From a hierarchical point of view, the credit division sits on the upper layer
of the front office because it approves business applications. However, a U.S. bank officer
might not accept a negative answer because they have higher authority. There is a climate
that allows such decision making in U.S. banks. A hierarchy does exist, but it is minimized
by decentralization; it is much flatter than Japanese and German banks.
6.5.4 Risk-taking
U.S. banks are more willing to take risks. This is significantly different from the banks
in Germany and Japan. The histories of major U.S. banks shows how they have expanded all
over the world. If they had not taken risks, how could they have become such worldwide
banks? Although this attitude sometimes causes trouble in other countries, it is certainly the
engine that drives the growth of the U.S. banking business.
6.5.5 Short-Term Perspective
Unlike Japanese and German banks, U.S. banks tend to regard business in the short
term, and this is exemplified in a performance-oriented evaluation system. It could be
described as future-oriented. U.S. banks pursue visible and realizable profits rather than
considering invisible and potential profits.
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It is not unusual for employees in U.S. banks to change jobs from one bank to another.
Many do not hesitate to move for reasons of better pay and promotions.
The willingness to take risks and the short-term perspective play a major role in the
growth of U.S. banks. They take risk and seek profit in the short term. If they fail, they
change strategies quickly. There are many trials and errors. A risk-taking attitude allows for
errors. If one makes a mistake or fails, it is only a waymark toward future success. They are
not tied to past legacies.
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6.6 Overall Summary
A summary of the three national banks is shown in Figure 6-2 below.
Figure 6-4
Individualism Collectivism
*-----------------------------------S
Decentralization Centralization
*-----------------------------------S
0
Low power disatance High power disatance
S----------------------------------0
Risk-averse Risk take
S-----------------------------------0
e
Short-term Long-term
&-----------------------------------S
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JAPAN
All Japanese banks pursue the same strategies, and all of them suffer the same bad debt
problems. This stems from a set of cultural factors that includes collectivism, centralization,
high power distance, high risk-aversion, and a long-term perspective that is
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past/present-oriented. These factors interact with one another. It is difficult to define a single
factor that dominates all Japanese banks. But I would say risk-aversion is a key factor that
dictates the Japanese way. Japanese bankers are afraid of failure and errors. When creating
any idea, this notion is apparent in the desire to reach consensus by collectivism, because the
collective group has a prime orientation to common goals and objectives (Persons and Shils,
1951). A perspective of long-term relationships also hampers risk-taking. Centralization and
a high power distance are organizational characteristics that reinforce the risk-averse
decision-making process.
U.S.
Each cultural aspect of U.S. banks positions them diametrically the opposite of
Japanese banks. A risk-taking attitude and short-term perspective reflect agile business
management. U.S. banks do not fear failure; the view is that even if they fail, there are other
opportunities to recover. Such agile management is supported by decentralization and lower
power distance in the organization. Individualism allows each worker to achieve incentives,
and it encourages people to make their goals. In U.S. banks, the willingness to take risk is
key to expanding business internationally and achieving diversity.
GERMANY
German banks fall generally in the middle between Japanese and U.S. banks. In terms
of individualism and decentralization, German banks are close to U.S. banks However, three
aspects are different from U.S. banks. German banks are more similar to Japan with their
horizontal time horizon. Banks in both countries emphasize a long-term perspective.
However, when it comes to power distance and risk, German banks fall somewhere in the
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middle between the U.S. and Japan.
Among German banks, I think the key issue is also the risk-taking attitude. German
banks were risk-averse before reunification, but they are now trying to change. Therefore,
their position on risk taking and risk-aversion is moving from the left (i.e., the Japan model)
to the right (the U.S. model). The strategies among major German banks result from progress
with this movement. Deutsche Bank made the move successfully and now is much closer to
U.S. banks, while other banks are still struggling.
Cultures may change. In this sense, however, the Japanese and U.S. cultures have
remained largely unchanged. These unchanged cultural aspects are reflected in the banking
business of both nation's banks. The problem for Japanese banks is that they do not try to
change their culture, especially their risk tolerance, whereas German banks recognized the
need and have made efforts to change.
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CHAPTER 7
Cultural Effects on the Three Nations' Banks
From the results of the interviews, given in the last three chapters, I have identified
cultural differences among the three nations' banks. In this chapter I will align my
conclusion with several empirical studies in the literature. My goal is to shed light on the
values or assumptions of Japanese culture, which I believe stem from the Samurai spirit. In
support of this, I will refer to the book Bushido, by Inazo Nitobe, and describe how the
Samurai spirit remains an integral part of the Japanese mindset as values and assumptions.
7.1 Individualism versus Collectivism
Figure 7-1 compares my conclusions drawn from the interviews with Hofstede's (2005)
ranking in terms of individualism and collectivism. My conclusion is consistent with
Hofstede's survey, that is, Japanese are highly collectivist, and the U.S. is very individualist
among the three countries that are part of this study. Hofstede defines individualism and
collectivism this way:
The vast majority of people in our world live in societies in which the interest of the
group prevails over the interest of the individual. We will call these societies
collectivist . . .A minority of people in our world live in societies in which the
interest of the individual prevail over the interest of the group, societies that we will
call individualist." (pp.,.74,75)
Hofstede's survey was done through questions in which the individualism index is
based on a set of fourteen work goals. He asked people in 74 countries and regions to think
about how important these questions were for them in an ideal job. Each answer was
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measured on a scale from 1 (of utmost important) to 5 (of very little or no important). The
results found that the U.S. is ranked number one (most individualist) in74 countries;
Germany is 18 th, and Japan is 3 3 rd
The relative positions of the three countries in Hofstede's survey are similar to those
found in my research. I concluded that Germans are closer to the U.S., while Hofstede shows
that Germans are in the middle between the U.S. and Japan. This difference might come
from differences of survey means and population to be researched between my survey and
Hofstede's.
Figure 7-1
Individualism Collectivism
S------------------------------------
Individualism Index Values for 74 Countries and Regions
USA Germany Japan
Rank 1 18 33
Score 91 67 46
Source: Geert & Gert Jan Hofstede (2005).
Where Hofstede's survey results surprised me was that the degree of collectivism in
Japan was not larger. Based on Hofstede's ranking and scores, Japan sits in the middle when
compared with the 74 countries. Many Latin American and Asian countries are apparently
even more collectivist. Among the three countries in this study, however, Japan is most
collectivist. But among Asian countries in general, Japan is one of the most individualistic
countries; only India ranked higher than Japan (see Appendix 4).
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7.2 Power Distance
According to Hofstede (2005), power distance is defined as the extent to which the
less-powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept
that power is distributed unequally. Hofstede created a power distance index based on his
surveys in 74 countries and regions. Three surveys were conducted based on three questions.
The first question asked how frequently employees were afraid to express disagreement with
their management. The other two questions were about subordinates' perception and
preference of their boss's actual decision-making style: autocratic or paternalistic.
Figure 7-2
Low power disatance High power disatance
0 -----------------------------------
S
Power Distance Index Values for 74 Countries and Regions
USA Germany Japan
Rank 57 63 49
Score 40 35 54
Source: Geert & Gert Jan Hofstede (2005).
Figure 7-2 shows my conclusion and Hofstede's survey. Japan has the highest power of
distance among three the countries, and my conclusion is aligned with Hofstede's survey.
However, I concluded that Germany's power distance is higher than the U.S. Hofstede
concluded that the U.S. position is between Japan and Germany, with Germany having the
least power distance among the three.
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This discrepancy is interesting to me because I concluded that power distance in
Germany is higher than the U.S.-and my experience supports this position. But my
conclusion might be drawn by extrapolating from a small population of interviews. I
recognize this problem, and will continue to analyze and focus on a comparison of the two
countries.
Looking at a cluster of Asian countries, Japan has the least power distance among all
Asian countries (see Appendix 5). This fact may help BTM reconsider how to behave and
conduct business in Asian countries, because while it is often said that Asian countries have
the same cultural background geographically and historically, we can also see relatively
more differences among Asians in this survey.
7.3 Risk Aversion
I believe the decision about how much risk to tolerate is a key issue with great
influence on the three nations' bank strategies, and each national culture shapes the thought
processes, the methods for conducting business, and the end results. There is no scale in
Hofstede's survey that depicts the degrees of risk aversion and the attitude toward
risk-taking. The closest Hofstede comes is "uncertainty avoidance" which is defined by him
as the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown
situations (p. 166).
I believe uncertainty avoidance is not a synonym for risk aversion, and these two
notions should not be confused. It could happen that even groups with high uncertainty
avoidance might take higher risk if they successfully exclude ambiguous and unknown
situations by reaching consensus. However, I believe uncertainty avoidance reflects the
national bank's risk-taking attitude. For Japanese banks, consensus is reached only by
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following those existing rules which are the most persuadable for all concerned. As people
try to handle issues within the rules they tend to take less risk.
On the other hand, U.S. banks have less uncertainty avoidance, which means they need
less consensus. Less consensus leads to more discretion of individual decision making and
allows people to often challenge the existing rules. If they can convince all concerned to
change rules, it works. Such power drives US banks to take more risk.
The survey on risk aversion was conducted using the same method as for measuring
individualism, with several questions regarding job stress.
Figure 7-3 illustrates my conclusion regarding attitudes toward risk of the three nations
compared with Hofstede's survey of uncertainty avoidance. The three countries' rankings in
both my scale and Hofstede's survey are the same.
Figure 7-3
Risk-averse Risk taker
e -----------------------------------
0
Uncertainty Avoidance Index Values for 74 Countries and Regions
Japan Germany USA
Rank 11 43 62
Score 92 65 46
Source: Geert & Gert Jan Hofstede (2005).
As my interviews showed, Japanese banks with high uncertainty avoidance scores are
fearful of ambiguous situations and unfamiliar risks. They tend to think many things are
dangerous. This leads them to start fewer new businesses, to experiment with fewer IT
innovations, and to focus on Japanese customers rather than expand internationally. On the
131
contrary, U.S. banks are not uncomfortable in ambiguous situations or with unfamiliar risks.
They are curious about things, so they tend to go into new businesses even if it involves risk.
Paradoxically, Japanese banks were, as a result, willing to engage in more risky
behavior in order to reduce ambiguity. Why does every Japanese bank suffer from the same
problem as a result of the same strategies? I think it is because following the same strategies
reduces ambiguity among the banks. During the bubble economy, Japanese banks lent
money to companies and took mortgages as collateral to hedge the credit risk. Everyone
believed real estate prices would not decline and mortgage collateral was the best method to
hedge credit risk based on the banks' past credit evaluation experience. Everyone assumed
"Once you take a mortgage as collateral, everything will be safe." Nothing negative occurred
in the past, so every bank did same thing.
However, there are multiple ways to hedge risk rather than only taking collateral, for
example, securitization, loan participation, and financial derivatives. The more diverse the
hedging methods, the distributed the risks. U.S. banks take high risks, but they hedge the
risk by diverse financial means: in the end, the credit exposed on risk was minimized.
Japanese banks hedge credit by only one type of hedging, and the result are that the actual
risk exposure is relatively high.
7.4 Long-term versus Short-term
In terms of the time horizon among the nations' three banks, there is no difference
between my conclusion and Hofstede's survey. Figure 7-4 shows this comparison.
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Figure 7-4
Short-term Long-term
e -----------------------------------
0
Long-Term Orientation Index Values for 39 Countries and Regions
USA Germany Japan
Rank 31 25 4
Score 29 31 80
Source: Geert & Gert Jan Hofstede (2005).
Hofstede defines long-term orientation as fostering virtues oriented toward future
rewards - in particular, perseverance and thrift; he defines short-term orientation as standing
for fostering virtues related to the past and present - in particular, respect for tradition,
preservation of "face," and fulfilling social obligations.
These definitions are somewhat different from my thoughts, explained in previous
chapters. I focused on how banks make decisions in relation to customers, and I believe that
a long-term perspective puts more value on past and present relationships when considering
future business. In this sense, a past-present orientation is part of the long-term perspective.
In my view, the short-term perspective values future issues more rather than past-present
relationships. So future orientation was included in the short-term perspective. In the end, I
do not see any critical misunderstanding between my conclusion and Hofstede's survey
results.
Japanese culture is very long-term-oriented, and U.S. culture is short-term- oriented. I
believe the difference between my findings and Hofstede's survey can be found in the
German position, which I found to be closer to Japan's culture, while Hofstede's survey
showed Germany to be closer to the U.S. culture. I suggested that German banks tend to
think of long-term relationships with customers, but they draw a rigid line. Recall Mr.
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Gershkowitz's comment that there are no longer any rigid long-term relationships. This
might imply that the distance between Germans and the U.S. is much shorter that I think.
7.5 Models of Organization
In Chapter Two I established a hypothesis that the power distance and tendency to
avoid risk affected a bank's strategy. Hofstede (2005) had this to say about these factors:
From the four dimensions of national culture . . . power distance and uncertainty
avoidance in particular affect our thinking about organizations. Organizing always
requires answering two questions: (1) who has the power to decide what? And (2)
what rules or procedures will be followed to attain the desired ends? The answer to
first question is influenced by cultural norms of power distance; the answer to the
second question, by cultural norms about uncertainty avoidance. (p. 242)
Figure 7-5 illustrates each country's position decided by power distance and
uncertainty avoidance. Countries that ranked high on both power distance and uncertainty
avoidance are generally bureaucratic;
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Figure 7-5
5 Power Distance Versus Uncertainty Avoidance
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Source: Geert & Gert Jan Hofstede, 2005, p. 243
in the "pyramid" quadrant where most Latin countries can be found, and Japan is part of this
group. In the opposite quadrant, countries that rank low on both power distance and
uncertainty avoidance are characterized as less hierarchical, more decentralized, and having
less formalized rules. This group is called the "market" type, and the United States is part of
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this group. Germany is not in either pyramid or market, but instead can be found in the
group with lower power distance and higher uncertainty avoidance characterized as
"machine." In this group, decisions are decentralized, but rules are more formal and
responsibility is clearly defined.
Figure 7-6 summarizes the countries that appear in each group. Some cover the
characteristics of Japanese banks that I have discussed so far - having a highly hierarchical
organization, centralized decision-making system, developing a core of elite employees, and
preferring coordination and consensus.
Figure 7-6 Emerging cultural profiles
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In Chapter Two I asked: if BTM accepted the suggested solutions, could it realize
significant improvements to its service? I believe the answer is No. BTM constructs its
organization and allocates employees because its way of thinking remains affected by
longstanding cultural norms. There were few leaders who are interested in the basic
assumptions of society, who understand how much their thinking and actions are linked to
these traditional norms. Rather, they are preoccupied with superficial issues. Leaders should
pay more attention to these issues when making decisions. Otherwise nothing will
substantially change, and things will continue superficially.
7.6 Assumptions about Japanese Culture
The four cultural aspects that I argue are the core values of each country, Schein (2004)
defines as "basic assumptions" because they are common characteristics from empirical tests
and so taken for granted that one finds little variation. I think centralization and
decentralization does not belong to the basic assumption, but are instead artifacts based on
the assumptions. It is the formation or procedure of decision making.
Where do these basic Japanese assumptions come from? I have spent considerable time
and many pages analyzing comparisons and differences among the three countries in order
to clarify cultural differences that lead to differences in the banks' strategies and results. To
understand Japanese banks, I believe focusing on the origins of our culture is essential,
because it will encourage us to understand the differences and give us an opportunity to
consider how and to what degree we must change ourselves.
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7.6.1 Samurai Society
I believe the origins of many of today's Japanese organizations go back to the samurai.
Samurai, or Japanese warriors, first appeared in the 11th century, and one samurai leader
established the first Shogunate in 1192. Since samurai were warriors, their organization was
a military institution. In 1603, following a long, war-torn era, the Tokugawa (a samurai
family) Shogunate dominated all of Japan, and all feudal samurai lords (Daimyo) became
subordinates of the Tokugawa samurai family. The government allocated samurai families to
each region throughout Japan, which were called domains (Han), and there were hundreds of
domains. During the Tokugawa government, peace lasted for 260 years, and the samurai
domains gradually transformed their military nature into more governmental administrations.
Each domain was led by a samurai family (Han-shu). A domain was comprised of many
samurai family subordinates, and their duties within the domain were allocated to each
samurai family according to the family's achievement during the war era. The domain duties
were transferred down to the next generation of family members by heredity. The hierarchy
at the top was the Han-shu family and hierarchical layers became more detailed.
After the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1867, a new Japanese government
was formed. It was led by the Japanese emperor, but most officers in the government were
former samurai, and they continued to implement the modified domain organization system
in the new government.
Samurai society was very family-oriented, with a culture that promoted collectivism
and uncertainty avoidance to ensure a sense of belonging. The strict hierarchy had a high
power distance, and the subordinate-superior relationship, based on the family and hierarchy,
held a long-term perspective.
138
From an organizational perspective, I think the samurai way of thinking remains
engrained in Japanese culture must be better understood in order to recognize how much it
affects our current ways thinking and behavior.
7.6.2 Inazo Nitobe
I believe the spirit of the samurai has formed current cultural assumptions in Japan.
Although there is considerable literature describing the samurai, I have chosen the book
Bushido, written by Inazo Nitobe, which describes the samurai spirit. It is the first and most
famous book written in English that explains the samurai spirit of 100 years ago. Even today,
many Japanese agree with its contents. In his book, Nitobe describes Bushido:
Bu-shi-do means literally Military-Knight-Ways - the ways which fighting nobles
should observe in their daily life and as well as in their vocation; in a word, the
"Precepts of Knighthood", the noblesse oblige of the warrior class. ... [It] is a
flower no less indigenous to the soil of Japan than its emblem, the cherry blossom;
nor is it a dried-up specimen of an antique virtue preserved in the herbarium of our
history. It is still a living object of power and beauty among us; and if it assumes no
tangible shape or form, it nevertheless scents the moral atmosphere and makes us
aware that we are still under its potent spell.
I use the word bushido (samurai's way) instead of "samurai spirit" in the following
discussion because it reflects more precisely the cultural nuance.
Inazo Nitobe was born in 1862, a son of a lower-level samurai family in northern Japan.
He studied agronomy at Sapporo Agricultural School, well-known because William Smith
Clark, a former president of the Massachusetts Agricultural College, was appointed as vice
president. After graduation from Sapporo, Nitobe went to the United States where he became
a Quaker. He worked in the League of Nations where he established a reputation as an
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internationally minded person. One day he was asked by a Belgian lawyer how Japan could
continue ethical education without religion, and he realized that his standard for deciding
whether something was right or wrong was based on bushido, which he had learned in his
young days in Japan. Nitobe passed away in 1933.
7.6.3 Bushido
According to Nitobe, bushido is derived from Buddhism, Shintoism, and
Confucianism. While he defines several aspects of bushido and explains each aspect very
precisely by referring to examples and comparing it with Christian concepts, I have
generalized the descriptions into three categories.
"Rectitude-or-Justice" (Gi or Seigi)
Rectitude-or-Justice refers to the power of making a decision. Once a samurai decides
something is right and true, he must keep that principle and must not change his belief, not
matter what happens. This is more valuable than individual knowledge or talent. Bushido
defines it this way: "Rectitude is the power to decide upon a certain course of conduct in
accordance with reason, without wavering; to die when it is right to die, to strike when it is
right to strike. Without rectitude, neither talent nor learning can make of a human frame a
samurai." (p.59)
These phrases are still often used in modern Japanese society, especially among
Japanese politicians who describe how willing they are to exemplify rectitude and justice on
behalf of the country. We also hear similar announcements from Japanese corporate leaders.
This notion touches Japanese minds, and it is easily understood and accepted.
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Rectitude-or-justice is not separate from "Courage" (Yfiki). Unless courage also has
rectitude and justice, it has little value. A samurai will die for what is right, but if he dies for
an unworthy purpose, it is defined as a "dog's death," which obtains no respect from anyone.
"Benevolence, the Feeling of Distress" (Jin, Sokuin no Kokoro)
Confucius emphasized again and again the importance of benevolence, so bushido
incorporated this virtue. Benevolence is love, sympathy, and compassion, and it is a virtue
that helped samurais as warriors to perform as humans with high virtues. According to
Bushido, "We knew benevolence was a tender virtue and mother-like... Benevolence to the
weak, the downtrodden or the vanquished, was ever extolled as particularly becoming to a
samurai." (p.85,89)
"Politeness" is also a virtue of bushido, and it results from benevolence and modesty. It
has the appearance of sympathy, in which people try to understand how and what other
people are feeling and thinking rather than thinking only of oneself. Nitobe explained, that
indeed politeness is one of the virtues of bushido, but it does not come first because it exists
as part of benevolence. Politeness without benevolence becomes a dead form.
In this regard, I believe personal performance evaluations systems based on
collectivism reflect benevolence and a high power distance based on a hierarchical
organization, and such systems are sustained by the power of politeness. Most Japanese
value seniority and higher rank/position/title because people in those positions are assumed
to have the right to respect as a result of their achievements.
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"Honor" (Meivo)
Every samurai had to be conscious of his inherent obligation and privileges attached to
the samurai family. Each samurai family had long-held traditions, so every samurai felt
honored to be born into a samurai family. Honor is an immortal part of a samurai's self.
Infringing that honor brings shame, and a samurai cannot abide a sense of shame. Nitobe
wrote: "The sense of shame was one of the earliest to be cherished in juvenile education.
"'You will be laughed at,'. .. 'It will disgrace you,'... 'Are you not ashamed?' were the last
appeals to correct behavior on the part of a youthful delinquent" (p. 131,133). This educated
behavior remains virtually unchanged in Japanese society today. One can hear parents
talking to their children with these phrases everywhere in Japan.
Nitobe continues: "The fear of disgrace was so great that if our literature lacks such
eloquence as Shakespeare puts into the mouth of Norfolk, it nevertheless hung like
Damocles' sword over the head of every samurai and often assumed a morbid character."
(p. 135). It means that sometimes, in the name of honor, a samurai fought others whom he
thought had infringed his honor, perhaps even taking an innocent life.
"The Duty of Royalty" is related to Honor. In bushido the state comes before
individuals, so individuals should be willing to die for the state or representative authority.
The infringement of a state's honor is synonymous with staining its honor.
Bushido was formed by samurai and recognized as the group of standards for all
samurai. However, Japan had more than just the samurai class. There were three inferior
class layers under samurai: farmers, manufacturers, and merchants. The ethical standards of
bushido were accepted by the those in the other classes because of its purity and high
dignity.
142
7.6.4 Sense of Shame
Figure 7-6 shows the relation of each bushido value described in Nitobe's book. Honor
and Sense of Shame are two sides of the same coin. A samurai behaves so as not to violate
his honor, but he also hates that his honor might be infringed by somebody.
Figure 7-6
Nowadays, most Japanese agree that they value honor and will conduct themselves so
that individual honor is not infringed, because if it is, it becomes a sense of shame. In other
words, Japanese hate shame, and they focus intently on how to avoid shame. In the samurai
era, if a samurai's honor was infringed, it was accepted that he would take brutal action
against the one who violated his honor because that was the right way to maintain honor and
it was justice. Nowadays, although circumstances have changed significantly, I think honor
and a sense of shame are still a strong part of the Japanese mindset. The defeat of World War
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II hurt Japanese honor and increased the sense of shame. It also energized the Japanese to
devote their energies to reconstructing the country and building economic prosperity.
A sense of shame is closely related to the fear of errors or making mistakes. The
Japanese do not like to fail because it is directly linked to shame. This feeling dominates
Japanese thinking, and is prevalent in Japanese banks. The collapse of the bubble economy
brought huge problems to the economy, and for Japanese banks it meant failure. If one
makes mistake, his honor is infringed; therefore people work hard to avoid infringing their
honor. Other assumptions, such as collectivism and high power distance, are directly related
to this concept.
I believe Japanese cultural values disturb the process of correcting problems. In the
example cited in Chapter Two, there were many problems, such as a lack of investigation,
poor communication, and a budget shortage. But ultimately, even when someone recognized
those problems, he could not take effective steps to correct them because of the sense of
shame. People sought ways to preserve both their own honor and that of their boss. Such
things have happened in every layer. At the end of day, it was announced that this project
had achieved "success." It was said that way, because it was the best way to preserve
everyone's honor.
In this sense, I believe the Japanese are, to great degree, influenced by bushido. Is
such thought consistent with bushido? I do not think so. As Figure 7-6 showed, bushido
values rectitude or justice. Every samurai upheld justice when he found something
wrong-even if his thought went against a superior person's opinion. However, obedience
without thinking is not justice but shame for a samurai.
Today the Japanese must recall and understand the meaning of bushido. For me
bushido has been distorted until only the sense of shame has become central in our culture.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
8.1 Culture Change
People often talk about culture. Culture is a useful word to define something different
and then finish up with the phrase "cultural issues." I was one of those people who liked and
tended to use the word "culture" in such a manner. Yet, how many people really understand
or have an interest in what culture is all about? In my business experience, there are few
people who take the time to think about culture or consider its correlation with company
dynamics in pragmatic ways.
Schein (2005) said that culture change, in the sense of changing basic assumptions, is
difficult, time-consuming, and highly anxiety-provoking. Considering the past 300 years in
Japan, the country has changed significantly in terms of social organizations, economics,
lifestyle, relations with foreign countries. On the other hand, the norms that govern daily life
in Japan have been the same for generations. These are assumptions that were formed in the
samurai era and have remained more or less unchanged over the last 300 years.
Bushido is one of those basic assumptions. Bushido is a fundamental assumption held
by every Japanese person. But at a company level, the assumption has been modified. Since
the Japanese banking industry was formed as a result of government initiatives, banks have
introduced a hierarchical and bureaucratic organization structure. Yet, the assumptions of the
samurai era have remained strong. The banking industry played a critical role during the
post-war years of recovery. As the economy continued to improve, banks did not experience
problems. However, the collapse of the bubble economy revealed some fundamental
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problems with the industry. Although the environment changed, banks continued to run their
business based on the old assumptions.
In terms of those assumptions, other Japanese companies, such as manufacturers, are no
exception-they are also affected by the assumptions. I believe even when people in different
industries talk about these Japanese cultural assumptions, all would agree with the arguments
associated with Bushido. However, it is apparent that the banking industry has a different
way of thinking and action than other industries. In my opinion, the difference comes from
handling some of the assumptions differently: e.g., how to deal with uncertainty avoidance.
Every Japanese company carefully avoids uncertainty, but reaching consensus as to how to
avoid ambiguous situations and create alignment with risk-taking is much different.
8.2 Uncertainty Avoidance and Risk Taking
Uncertainty avoidance is a key issue when developing strategies in Japanese banks, but
uncertainty avoidance is not the same as a risk-taking attitude. While uncertainty avoidance
is a fundamental assumption of the Japanese people, risk-taking differs among Japanese
companies. Uncertainty avoidance drives the action to avoid ambiguities by achieving
consensus and also confirms one's sense of belonging. In the case of Japanese banks, this
consensus based on uncertainty avoidance directs and biases risk aversion.
The reason for this is the tight correlation between fear of failure as a result of taking
risk and a sense of honor. The sense of honor is one virtue of bushido, and its other side is a
sense of shame. This sense of shame is amplified in the banking industry. Japanese banks
were developed by the initiative of the Japanese government because banks were the key to
expanding the economy. Therefore, banks have a culture similar to that of government
officials in terms of organization and thought processes. Government officials were elites and
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in their culture no failure was allowed. If one made a mistake, there was never another
chance to be promoted. One's honor was disgraced and it resulted in enormous shame.
Japanese banks have taken this assumption. People view bank officers as belonging to
the elites, and banks tend to hire students who have graduated from prestigious universities.
Banks also require freshmen to behave in a manner that is not perceived as shameful by the
public. Those people usually have only successful experiences because they do everything to
avoid failure. In the banks, failure means demotion, and one is rarely given a second chance.
As a result, bank officers seek consensus, take less risk, and avoid uncertainty.
How about other Japanese companies? In my opinion, Toyota, for example, the largest
automobile manufacturing company in Japan, also embraces uncertainty avoidance, but that
company's method of reaching consensus differs from banks. Toyota takes risk but they
analyze the risk and carefully consider hedging solutions. Failure also means shame for them,
but the fear of failure drives people to improve and resolve problems. Once a mistake or
failure occurs, it does not automatically mean demotion or a poor performance evaluation.
It all goes back to the sense of honor in bushido. Bushido holds that doing the right
thing is genuine honor. If you have a failure, you have to accept it gracefully. If you cannot,
that is the real shame.
8.3 Implication for German and U.S. Banks
As the interviews showed, German banks undertake almost the same strategies as
Japanese banks did ten years ago. But German banks have been changing, especially in terms
of risk-taking. In my experience, Germans are perceived as relatively conservative and they
prefer less risk than U.S. banks. They dislike change. The German people also emphasize
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consensus, which is, to some degrees, the same as in the Japanese culture. Both seek to avoid
uncertainty.
One phrase that several German interviewees used was that German banks had lost
some of their "German-ness," which was impressive to me. German banks have undoubtedly
changed their assumptions, especially since it is now necessary for German banks to compete
with foreign banks not only in the domestic market but also in the international market. In
this sense, Japanese banks have not and will not lose their "Japanese-ness." Our assumptions
remain unchanged.
U.S. banks' assumptions are different from Japanese banks. Since Japan has been
greatly influenced by the U.S., Japanese banks tend to introduce and use the useful factors
that U.S. banks have undertaken successfully, including the business unit organization
structure, achievement-driven personnel evaluation system and an emphasis on investment
banking. The OVS case described in Chapter 2 was the decision based on an American
consulting firm.
However, there are major differences between the U.S. and Japanese cultures. Even if
Japanese banks use the same system that U.S. banks have used successfully, it does not mean
that Japanese banks can effectively replicate the success of U.S. banks. The system worked in
the U.S. banks because they played within their own rules (assumptions). Japanese banks
have other rules (assumptions). The key is to carefully analyze the U.S. banks' useful
measures and strategies to see if they fit the Japanese way of thinking and doing. If Japanese
banks try to replicate the U.S. banks' processes without careful consideration, it would not
work. As described in Chapter 3, U.S. bank profitability, their diverse business portfolios,
and wider geographical network prevail over Japanese banks. Hence, Japanese banks are
trying to incorporate U.S. strategies into their business plan as soon as possible. But, they
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also must consider how the essence of U.S. banks' strategies would be sustained by Japanese
assumptions.
German banks have tried to replicate U.S. banks' strategies, but they do it carefully and
changes take time. Germans do not like to change, but if necessary they are willing to change
over the long term. Since the Japanese culture is similar, it might be useful for Japanese
banks to analyze how German banks are changing rather than attaching so much importance
to the U.S. banks' ways of thinking and doing.
8.4 Implication for Japanese Banks
Japanese banks should look carefully at the way they think and how they do business
based on basic cultural assumptions. When they have acquired some insight about the
differences, I believe they will evolve more effective strategies that fit the Japanese banks.
Germany and the U.S. are foreign countries. They think and act differently than do the
Japanese. More important is that Japan needs to understand and recognize the differences
rightly. Understanding others and understanding oneself are the two sides of the same coin,
and they interact and sustain each other.
We can understand ourselves better if we follow the principles of bushido and the
culture of the samurai societies. Royalty is one virtue of bushido. This does not mean that
people should obey their superiors and give up their independence. The samurai were
required to deliberate on their inner beliefs and align their convictions with bushido. If they
were convinced that their master's thinking was incorrect, they had to admonish the master's
incorrect thought. This was not for his individual favor, but for the good of the entire
domain's prosperity. This was the honor of the samurai. The domain that kept many samurai
who did the right things through bushido had a strong organization that sustained the domain.
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I think the individual independence of the samurai sustained the collectivist samurai culture.
The greater question is: Why do Japanese banks lack this spirit of independence?
On the other hand, as long as each samurai insisted on his own opinion based on his
belief, it was hard for the samurai leader to control his subordinates and take the organization
in the right direction. Without strong leadership, the domain could devolve into chaos.
Samurai leaders had to have leadership ability and deep understanding of bushido to control
the brave and honest samurais. They were the people who aligned their philosophies to
bushido and persuaded their subordinates to aim for the same goals. In this sense, a samurai
leader's beliefs were transformed into assumptions.
Schein (2005) wrote: "The most central issue for leaders, therefore, is how to get at the
deeper levels of a culture, how to assess the functionality of the assumptions made at that
level, and how to deal with the anxiety that is unleashed when those levels are challenged."
(p. 37) I agree with this assertion. What is needed for the leaders of Japanese banks is to
deeply understand their culture and reflect it in their organization and strategies. In the
process, what should be changed and what should not be changed will become clear.
Japanese banks announced in their 2004 Annual Reports that their goal was to achieve a
certain ranking in terms of market value among all international banks. They also mentioned
the strong competition in today's wave of globalization. But each bank's goal does not have
to be the same. Every major Japanese bank does not have to aim for globalization. The
meaning of globalization can be different among them. The leaders of Japanese banks have to
develop insight about their strengths and weaknesses and set the bank's goals to incorporate
their cultural assumptions. And if needed, the leaders should challenge current assumptions.
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BTM merged with UFJ Bank in January 2006 to become the largest bank in the world
in terms of asset volume. This is an excellent time for the bank to consider the need for
changing its culture in order to make the giant leap toward becoming a genuine global bank.
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Appendix 1
Japanese interviewees
Suzuki, Shunsuke: Chief Manager, Corporate Banking Division
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. Tokyo, Japan
Enomoto, Masaki: Chief Manager, Corporate Banking Division
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. Tokyo, Japan
Murakami, Hiroshi: Chief Manager, Japanese Corporate Group, New York Branch
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd New York, United States
Kogure, Takeshi: Manager, IT Business Division
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. Tokyo, Japan
Asano, Fumihiro: Chief Manager, Financial Services Department, Diisseldorf Branch
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd. Diisseldorf, Germany
Otsubo, Shunichi: Vice President
BTM Capital Corporation, Boston, United States
Takeuchi, Isao: Senior Manager, Corporate Banking Planning Division
Mizuho Bank, Ltd. Tokyo, Japan
German Interviewees
Henrychowski, Detlev: Director, Diisseldorf Branch
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., Diisseldorf, Germany
Krings, Jilrg: Manager, Financial Services Department, Diisseldorf Branch
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., Diisseldorf, Germany
Hundt, Stefan: Corporate Analyst
Deutsche Bank AG, Cologne, Germany
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Bockenheimer, Heiz-Giinter: Vice President, Financial Institutions Asia Pacific/Latin
America, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, Germany
American Interviewees
Jeffers, John: Senior Vice President, Global Relationship Banking
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Trust Company, New York
Leffler, Michael: Vice President, Global Relationship Banking
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Trust Company, New York
Lapierrre, Susan: Vice President
East Cambridge Saving Bank, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Gershkowitz, Todd: Group Head of Compensation & Benefits
UBS, New York
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Appendix 2
Interview Questionnaire
I appreciate very much your taking time for me. I would like to give you some
background. This interview will be used as part of my thesis for a Masters degree at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Boston, Massachusetts.
Purpose of this interview
In the corporate banking business, major Japanese banks are increasingly following
an international strategy to enhance their business. As a result, they are competing directly
with European and US banks
In my career in corporate banking and my work experience in Europe, there seemed
to be a large strategic gap between Japanese and European (especially German) banks.
However, the strategic differences within each country group seem to be relatively small. My
question is: why are there such differences and how do these differences affect the financial
results of the banks? Specifically, I want to look at cultural differences that may differentiate
the business strategies that European, American, and Japanese banks follow.
My thesis will describe and compare the strategies followed by several major
Japanese, European, and American banks. I am planning to collect public information on the
banks and review the available literature. Second, I will conduct interviews with selected
people who are knowledgeable about banking strategies in three global regions. Third, I may
interview representatives of banks in the three areas
With this explanation in mind, I would like to talk to you about the following
questions. If some items are confidential and you cannot disclose such information, you do
not have to provide details about your organization. However, it would be helpful if you
could answer from your personal perspectives as much as possible.
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Questions
1. The organization of your corporate banking division
1-1. What does your bank's organization structure look like (any significant differences
from Japanese bank)?
1-2. What is the organizational responsibility structure?
1-3. Tell me about employee work contracts and the human resources development
system
1-4. Describe the personal performance evaluation system.
1-5. How close or far is the relation between employer and the union
1-6. How about the relation between front office and the systems and operation
division?
2. Corporate banking strategy
2-1. What is the target customer segment?
2-2. Tell me about the function of a "main bank system"
2-3. Describe your risk evaluation system
2-4. How do you think quantitative factors' affect the evaluation of credit risks?
2-5. What about the system investment policy?
The attached file summarizes the organizational and strategic characteristics of a Japanese
bank.
Best regards
Seiichi Kuroiwa
MIT Sloan Fellows Program
In Innovation and Global Leadership
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Appendix 3
Interview Methodology
1. Scope
The purpose of the interviews is to research each national bank's organizational
structure and business strategies-information that cannot be obtained from published
data. Since my thesis focuses on how and to what extent the cultural issues effect a bank's
process of structuring and running the organization and making business strategies,
interviews are necessary in order to obtain information from people who reside in the
three countries and are familiar with their country's culture.
My thesis focuses exclusively on the banking industry. Within the industry, I focus on
major banks in each country. There are a variety of banks ranging from small size and
local business-oriented banks to the international players. However, I will remain within
the category of national banks so the comparison is with similar subjects.
For the data analysis, I chose four top Japanese banks including my own employer
(BTM), four top German banks, and three top U.S. banks. Because there is no fourth U.S.
bank to compare with the other two national banks, I picked only three U.S. banks.
Out of each national bank group, I chose BTM, Deutsche Bank, and Citibank as
representative of each country.
2. Selection
In terms of selecting interviewees, I focused on people who are working or have
worked at the top of each national bank (BTM, Deutsche Bank, and Citibank). I selected
bank officers who seemed to have similar careers in the corporate banking business.
I asked each interview candidate for an appointment by e-mail and submitted the
questionnaire (see Appendix 2) in advance.
Since it was difficult to access people in Citibank, I conducted interviews with two
offices of BTM in New York, one with UBS in New York who had work experience at
Citibank, and a local Massachusetts bank in Cambridge. As they were all American banks
and have sufficient bank experience in the U.S., I believe they represent typical American
bankers for purposes of my interviews.
3. Place of interview
All interviews were conducted between January and March 2006. I visited the
interviewees in their own country. Most of the Japanese interviewees are current bank
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officers at BTM, so those interviews were held in the Tokyo area. For the German
interviews, I visited each person at their offices located in DiUsseldorf and Frankfurt. I
interviewed two Americans in New York, one in Cambridge and one in Boston.
4. Length of interview
The length of each interview differed. Some interviewees spent more than three hours
in conversation with me, but some were too busy to take more than an hour. On average,
each interview lasted about 1.5 hours. Since I interviewed 15 people, the total amount of
time spent interviewing is estimated to be at least 22.5 hours.
5. Interview Sequence
The sequence of interviews went from Japan, to Germany, to the U.S. because it was
necessary for me to acquire a comprehensive understanding and fix standards based on
the culture of Japanese banks. Since I have worked in Germany for seven years, it was
useful to interview Germans at a second national bank to enable comparison with
Japanese banks.
The U.S. banks were last because I am less familiar with the U.S. bank business than
I am with Japanese and German banks. Therefore I thought I could make the most
effective interview with American bank employees by using the information and
understanding gained from the two other national banks.
I used two types of interviews. One followed the questionnaire format that I had sent
each interviewee beforehand. This method was used mostly for the first and second
interviewees. Another type of interview asked selected questions. As I gathered
information from the first two or three interviewees, I thought it was unnecessary to
repeat the same questions to every interviewee according to the questionnaire.
6. How I took notes
I jotted down the main points of the interviews during our conversation. After each
interview I made a summary of each interview's content in Japanese and also made a
chart to help me compare the three national banks afterward. When something was
unclear, I asked the interviewee to confirm my note regarding his interview. This kind of
confirmation was conducted primarily via e-mail.
After writing the Japanese summary, I translated my notes into English and included
the information in the thesis in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
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Appendix 4
Individualism Index (IDV) Values for 74 Countries and Regions
COUNTRY/REGION SCORE RANK COUNTRY/REGION SCORE RANK
United States
Australia
Great Britain
Canada total
Hungary
Netherlands
New Zealand
Belgium Flemish
Italy
Denmark
Canada Quebec
Belgium Walloon
France
Sweden
Ireland
Norway
Switzerland German
Germany
South Africa
Switzerland French
Finland
Estonia
Luxembourg
Poland
Malta
Czech Republic
Austria
Israel
Slovakia
Spain
India
Suriname
Argentina
Japan
Morocco
Iran
Jamaica
1
2
3
4-6
4-6
4-6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13-14
13-14
15
16-17
16-17
18
19
20
21
22-24
22-24
22-24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33-35
33-35
33-35
36
37-38
Russia
Arab countries
Brazil
Turkey
Uruguay
Greece
Croatia
Philippines
Bulgaria
Mexico
Romania
East Africa
Portugal
Slovenia
Malaysia
Hong Kong
Serbia
Chile
Bangladesh
China
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
West Africa
Salvador
Korea (South)
Taiwan
Peru
Trinidad
Costa Rica
Indonesia
Pakistan
Colombia
Venezuela
Panama
Ecuador
Guatemala
Scores for countries or regions in bold type were calculated from the IBM database.
Scores for other countries or regions were based on replications or estimates.
1 The data were from whites only.
Source: Geert & Gert Jan Hofstede (2005) Cultures and Organization, p.78,79 McGraw-Hill
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37-38
39-40
39-40
41
42
43
44
45
46-48
46-48
46-48
49-51
49-51
49-51
52
53-54
53-54
55
56-61
56-61
56-61
56-61
56-61
56-61
62
63
64
65-66
65-66
67
68-69
68-69
70
71
72
73
74
Appendix 5
Power Distance Index (PDI) Values for 74 Countries and Regions
COUNTRY/REGION SCORE RANK COUNTRY/REGION SCORE RANK
Malaysia
Slovakia
Guatemala
Panama
Philippines
Russia
Romania
Serbia
Suriname
Mexico
Venezuela
Arab countries
Bangladesh
China
Ecuador
Indonesia
India
West Africa
Singapore
Croatia
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Morocco
Switzerland
French
Vietnam
Brazil
France
Hong Kong
Poland
Belgium Walloon
Colombia
Salvador
Turkey
East Africa
Peru
Thailand
Chile
104
104
95
95
94
93
90
86
85
81
81
80
80
80
78
78
77
77
74
73
71
70
70
70
70
69
68
68
68
67
67
66
66
64
64
64
63
1-2
1-2
3-4
3-4
5
6
7
8
9
10-11
10-11
12-14
12-14
12-14
15-16
15-16
17-18
17-18
19
20
21
22-25
22-25
22-25
22-25
26
27-29
27-29
27-29
30-31
30-31
32-33
32-33
34-36
34-36
34-36
37-38
Portugal
Belgium Flemish
Uruguay
Greece
Korea (South)
Iran
Taiwan
Czech Republic
Spain
Malta
Pakistan
Canada Quebec
Japan
Italy
Argentina
South Africa
Trinidad
Hungary
Jamaica
Estonia
Luxembourg
United States
Canada total
Netherlands
Australia
Costa Rica
Germany
Great Britain
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Ireland
Switzerland
German
New Zealand
Denmark
Israel
Austria
Scores for countries or regions in bold type were calculated from the IBM database.
Scores for other countries or regions were based on replications or estimates.
1 The data were from whites only.
Source: Geert & Gert Jan Hofstede (2005) Cultures and Organization, p.43,44 McGraw-Hill
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37-38
39-40
39-40
41-42
41-42
43-44
43-44
45-46
45-46
47
48
49-50
49-50
51
52-53
52-53
54
55
56
57-59
57-59
57-59
60
61
62
63-65
63-65
63-65
66
67-68
67-68
69
70
71
72
73
74
Appendix 6
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) Values for 74 Countries and Regions
COUNTRY/REGION SCORE RANK COUNTRY/REGION SCORE RANK
Greece
Portugal
Guatemala
Uruguay
Belgium Flemish
Malta
Russia
Salvador
Belgium Walloon
Poland
Japan
Serbia
Suriname
Romania
Slovenia
Peru
Argentina
Chile
Costa Rica
France
Panama
Spain
Bulgaria
Korea (South)
Turkey
Hungary
Mexico
Israel
Colombia
Croatia
Brazil
Venezuela
Italy
Czech Republic
Austria
Luxembourg
Pakistan
112
104
101
100
97
96
95
94
93
93
92
92
92
90
88
87
86
86
86
86
86
86
85
85
85
82
82
81
80
80
76
76
75
74
70
70
70
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9-10
9-10
11-13
11-13
11-13
14
15
16
17-22
17-22
17-22
17-22
17-22
17-22
23-25
23-25
23-25
26-27
26-27
28
29-30
29-30
31-32
31-32
33
34
35-38
35-38
35-38
Switzerland French
Taiwan
Arab countries
Morocco
Ecuador
Germany
Thailand
Bangladesh
Canada Quebec
Estonia
Finland
Iran
Switzerland German
Trinidad
West Africa
Netherlands
East Africa
Australia
Slovakia
Norway
New Zealand
South Africa
Canada total
Indonesia
United States
Philippines
India
Malaysia
Great Britain
Ireland
China
Vietnam
Hong Kong
Sweden
Denmark
Jamaica
Singapore
Scores for countries or regions in bold type were calculated from the IBM database.
Scores for other countries or regions were based on replications or estimates.
1 The data were from whites only.
Source: Geert & Gert Jan Hofstede (2005) Cultures and Organization, p. 168,169 McGraw-Hill
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35-38
39
40-41
40-41
42
43
44
45-47
45-47
45-47
48-49
48-49
50
51
52
53
54
55-56
55-56
57
58-59
58-59
60-61
60-61
62
63
64
65
66-67
66-67
68-69
68-69
70-71
70-71
72
73
74
Appendix 6
Long-Term Orientation Index (LTO) Values for 39 Countries and Regions
COUNTRY/REGION SCORE RANK COUNTRY/REGION SCORE RANK
China
Hong Kong
Taiwan
Japan
Vietnam
Korea (South)
Brazil
India
Thailand
Hungary
Singapore
Denmark
Netherlands
Norway
Ireland
Finland
Bangladesh
Switzerland
France
Belgium total
118
96
87
80
80
75
65
61
56
50
48
46
44
44
43
41
40
40
39
38
1
2
3
4-5
4-5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13-14
13-14
15
16
17-18
17-18
19
20-21
Slovakia
Italy
Sweden
Poland
Austria
Australia
Germany
Canada Quebec
New Zealand
Portugal
United States
Great Britain
Zimbabwe
Canada
Philippines
Spain
Nigeria
Czech Republic
Pakistan
Scores for countries or regions in bold type were calculated from the original Chinese Value Survey databas
Scores for other countries or regions were based on replications.
Source: Geert & Gert Jan Hofstede (2005) Cultures and Organization, p.211 McGraw-Hill
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20-21
22
23
24
25-27
25-27
25-27
28-30
28-30
28-30
31
32-33
32-33
34
35-36
35-36
37
38
39
- -
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